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Abstract
A number of corporate law scholars have recently proposed
granting shareholders an enhanced right to oversee the use of
takeover defenses. While these ‘shareholder choice’ proposals
vary somewhat in their content, they generally agree that shareholder oversight is justiÞed if and only if shareholders hold a
bona Þde advantage over managers in evaluating and responding
to hostile bids. This article challenges that basic premise, arguing that even if shareholders enjoy a comparative advantage over
management in reacting to hostile bids, it does not follow that
a shareholder choice regime is value enhancing, because it would
give managers an incentive to search for ways to thwart prospective oversight, perhaps even through value-destroying managerial
choices that render the Þrm an unattractive takeover target. We
demonstrate (a) that a number of such thwarting defenses exist, (b) that managerial threats to use them are credible, and (c)
that their utilzation would be diﬃcult or impossible for courts
to regulate. We also Þnd empirical support for these hypotheses.
Consequently, an immutable, one-size-Þts-all shareholder choice
rule is likely to be an imprudent policy choice for courts.
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Introduction

In the years since the infamous takeover wave of the 1980s, managers
of public corporations have developed increasingly innovative strategies
for fending oﬀ unwanted tender oﬀers. Although defensive strategies (including poison pills, classiÞed and staggered boards, dual class stock capitalization, and the like) initially induced great suspicion among judges,
over time courts adopted a signiÞcantly more deferential tone. Managers
of Delaware corporations1 — while generally prohibited from playing favorites among bidders once a control change of the company has become
inevitable2 — face few obstacles in erecting defenses that deter unwanted
acquisitions.3 Moreover, evidence suggests that corporate boards have
used this power eﬀectively to deter hostile acquirers while encouraging
only friendly bids.4
The perceived widespread use of defensive tactics has motivated
some corporate law scholars to advocate transferring discretion over such
measures from managers to shareholders. Their argument is relatively
straightforward, consisting of two interlocking parts: First, when facing
a hostile oﬀer, managers are likely motivated less by a desire to serve the
interests of the corporation than by a desire to preserve their own positions, since hostile acquisitions frequently portend managerial turnover.
And second, the moment of a hostile oﬀer is one where shareholders possess uncharacteristic incentives and abilities to become informed about
the fair value of the company. Accordingly, some corporate scholars propose, the context of a takeover bid is one where shareholders’ judgment
is ultimately more reliable than that of professional managers.5
The universe of “shareholder choice” proposals is relatively varied,
depending on the scope and contours of those defensive measures that
would fall within shareholders’ discretion. Under some variations, shareholders would have the authority to overturn defenses adopted after a
1

While Delaware is but a single state, it accounted for nearly three Þfths of all
publicly listed companies in 2002.
2
See, e.g., Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1994).
3
These categorical strategies are often dubbed “Just Say No” defenses. Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); cf. Unitrin, Inc. v.
American General Corp, 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
4
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 Stan.
L. Rev. 887 (2002) (analyzing the eﬀect of poison pills used in combination with
”eﬀective stiaggered boards”).
5
See infra Section 2 (discussing the current literature).
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hostile bid becomes imminent (what we hereinafter call “post-bid defenses”), regardless of whether such a defense also served other legitimate purposes.6 Other variations focus on tailoring rather than timing,
granting shareholders the authority to override either pre- or post-bid
defenses whose only eﬀect is to deter hostile bids (what we hereinafter
call “pure defenses”).7
Nevertheless, despite this heterogeneity, shareholder choice proposals
generally share a common prescriptive feature: that shareholders should
be granted authority over defenses if, but only to the extent that, they
enjoy bona Þde advantage over managers in evaluating and responding
to a hostile bid (given managers’ agency costs). The most aggressive
shareholder choice proposals, therefore, generally limit shareholder authority to over-turn post-bid and pure defenses; they fall short of short of
extending shareholder authority that extends even to ordinary business
decisions. In ordinary business decisions made outside of the takeover
context,8 shareholders have little incentive or ability to become adequately aware of the underlying issues at stake (indeed, that is why the
shareholders hire a manager to begin with). Moreover, in such routine,
workaday settings, self-preservation is less likely to motivate managers’
actions, and accordingly managerial authority is optimal.9
In this article, we argue that the case for shareholder choice is not
as ineluctable as its proponents suggest. In particular, we show that
even if shareholders enjoy a comparative advantage over managers in
assessing and reacting to hostile bids, giving shareholders control over
defensive tactics may nonetheless work against their own interests. The
intuition behind our argument lies in recognizing that the allocation
of control rights over defensive tactics not only aﬀects the Þrm after a
tender oﬀer is announced, but also may aﬀect how managers manage
the Þrm ex ante.10 Subjecting managers to a shareholder choice regime
would not remove their desire to deter hostile bids; if anything, managers
6
Examples of such post-bid defenses that may also serve legitimate purposes include a friendly merger or post-bid restructuring.
7
See infra Section 2 (discussing the current literature).
8
Indeed, even when a ordinary decision entails a conßict of interest, corporate
scholars generally prefer to vest authority over the decision in outside directors.
E.g., Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law Chap. (1991). By contrast, in the case of tender oﬀers, many corporate
scholars advocate shareholder authority even when the Þrm has a majority of outside
directors. See infra Section 2.
9
See infra Section 2 (discussing the current literature).
10
For a discussion of other ex ante considerations aﬀecting the validity of shareholder choice, see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism:
Anti-Takeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, Univ. Penn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003).
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under such a rule would have a stronger incentive to deter acquisitions
activity, since an eﬀective shareholder choice regime11 maximizes the
probability that the Þrm receives a hostile rather than a friendly oﬀer.
Consequently, managers would have an incentive to search for eﬀective
defenses that are not regulated by the rule.
As we demonstrate below, a wide range of such defenses appears to
exist. Even under the strongest shareholder choice regime, managers
will almost certainly have access to unregulated (and unregulable) defenses.12 For example, if managers were precluded from pursuing either
pure defenses or post-bid defenses (as deÞned above), it would still be
possible to “embed” defenses into a host of seemingly ordinary business
transactions, with the eﬀect of deterring subsequent bids. A notable example of such embedded defenses is the inclusion of “change of control”
provisions in everyday business contracts (such as lease, joint ventures,
licenses, employment contracts and debt instruments) that imposes costs
on the Þrm in the event of a change of control.13 These provisions, particularly when employed in a variety of the Þrm’s contracts, can be suﬃcient
to deter most (if not all) bids. A strong shareholder choice rule, when it
encourages this form of substitute defense, may have the unintended effect of reducing Þrm value not only by deterring takeovers (both friendly
and hostile) but also by ineﬃciently altering the very operating proÞle
of the Þrm.14
There a number of reasons to believe that embedded defenses (such as
those described above) would pose a bona Þde threat under a shareholder
choice regime. First, as even proponents of shareholder choice concede,
courts are poorly positioned to regulate day-to-day managerial decisions
made outside of the context of a tender oﬀer, and which likely have
legitimate business justiÞcations. This very diﬃculty in second-guessing
managerial decisions lies at the core of the business judgment rule, which
is itself a cornerstone of American corporate law.
Second, managers would almost certainly have the strong incentive to
employ (indeed invent) unregulated embedded defenses under a share11

In this article, we focus on the strongest shareholder choice regimes that grant
shareholders ultimate authority to determine the fate of all pure and post-bid defenses. E.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers,
69 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 973 (2002).
12
See infra text accompanying notes __-_- (discussing why these defenses would
be so diﬃcult to regulate).
13
See infra Section III (discussing the availability of pre-bid embedded defenses).
14
While others have noted the possibility of defense substitution, they have not
examined either the breadth of available substitutes or whether managers can be
expected to adopt these substitutes, even if doing so could decrease the probability
of friendly deals. See infra note __ (discussing other articles that recognize the
possibility of defense substitution).
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holder choice regime. From management’ perspective, a shareholder
choice regime would eﬀectively transform all acquisitions into hostile
ones, as acquirers would no longer need to bid for managerial support
of a takeover bid, thereby eliminating most of the private beneÞts managers might reap from friendly acquisitions. This transformation would
increase the beneÞt to managers of deterring acquisitions because hostile
acquisitions present a real threat of termination. It also would reduce
the cost to managers of using blanket defenses, as managers now would
gain little from permitting acquisitions.
Consequently, while shareholder choice proponents are correct to
point out that limiting managerial control would increase the gain to
shareholders of those takeovers that do occur, we show that it also would
provide managers with increased incentives to employ substitute embedded defenses, including blanket defenses that deter hostile and friendly
deals alike. While the former would increase shareholder value, the latter would reduce it. The case for shareholder choice, therefore, depends
on which of the above two eﬀects is likely to predominate at the Þrm
level. This question is diﬃcult to answer on a priori grounds.
Accordingly, we contend that it is not possible to make a general case
for the superiority of shareholder choice over rules granting boards considerable veto power over hostile tender oﬀers. In those situations where
managers have little ability to use strategic embedded defenses, shareholder choice has much to commend it. However, in situations where
managers can (and would) employ embedded defenses to deter bids, the
imposition of shareholder choice could prove counter-productive. We
therefore doubt that an immutable, one-size-Þts-all rule is appropriate
in such heterogeneous contexts. Rather, courts may wish to give increased deference to the choices shareholders themselves have made to
grant managers power over takeovers whenever such choices appear to
be clear.15
Before commencing with our argument, four caveats deserve speciÞc
mention. First, it is important to note that under the prevailing legal
regime, pre-bid, embedded defenses (as we have described them) are
probably not a particularly pervasive practice. This observation, however, does not detract from the legitimacy of our argument that such
15
Thus, we are more cautious than others about whether courts can conÞdently
invalidate antitakeover provisions that shareholders consented to (either at the IPO
stage or through a shareholder vote). Compare with Ronald Gilson, The Case
Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 775 (1981-1982) (suggesting that courts invalidate certain
pre-bid pure defenses notwithstanding shareholder approval). For a diﬀerent arguement favoring respect of shareholders’ ex ante decisions to grant managers authority
over takeovers see Kahan & Rock, supra note [corp constitutionalism].
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embedded defenses are a potential threat. Indeed, the relative paucity
of such defenses is in large part due to the fact that the current regime
consciously permits managers to deter hostile bids through more targeted means. If courts adopted proposals to alter this regime to give
shareholders greater voice over defensive measures, however, managers
would have a strong incentive to adjust their own behavior towards such
embedded defenses.
Second, a discussion of how managers may respond to enhanced
shareholder choice should also take into consideration that shareholders too may anticipate this managerial response and alter their own
conduct accordingly. In particular, shareholders might respond to the
specter of embedded defenses by promulgating incentive schemes that tie
managers’ welfare more closely to that of the Þrm. Shareholders could
be expected, for example, to increase managers’ incentive compensation
(stock ownership, options etc). Our analysis takes this possibility into
account, and it demonstrates why such shareholder responses would not
fully cure the problem. First, because such incentives must come from
shareholders, there may be cases in which shareholders simply decline
(or are unable) to make suﬃcient incentive payments to induce the eﬃcient decisions.16 Second, we show that even when shareholders do oﬀer
managers appropriate incentive compensation, the amounts awarded are
must be so large that non-managerial shareholders would be better oﬀ
under a regime that simply granted managers the power to deter hostile
bids.
Third, although we animate our arguments by comparing a strong
shareholder choice regime to a polar opposite regime of strong managerial choice, this does not imply that the optimal default rule for
a Þrm must be one of these extreme points.17 While the strongest
shareholder choice regimes provide managers with excessive incentives
16

Indeed, the arguments for shareholder choice are predicated on the idea that
executive incentive compensation does not adequately amerliorate agency cost problems. See Ehud Kamer, (discussing the eﬀect of executive compensation in more
detail). Compare Kahan & Rock, supra note [chiLRev] (discussing adaptive mechanisms shareholders can use to mute the agency costs associated with a managerial
veto regime) with Jennifer Arlen, Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, 69
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 917 (2002) (discussing the limits of adaptive solutions).
17
See Jennifer Arlen, Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, 69 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 917 (2002) (discussing that courts have the capacity to adopt some controls
that shareholders cannot replicate by contract); see also Luca Anderlini, Leonardo
Felli, & Andrew Postlewaite, Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingenies, Pennsylvania Institute of Economic Research Working Paper No. 01-010 (making this point
generally).
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to adopt value-reducing defenses, unalloyed managerial veto rules may
not adequately discipline managers’ eﬀorts to misappropriate private
beneÞts. In most general settings, the optimal rule is likely to be an
intermediate one, disallowing certain value-reducing defenses, but nevertheless granting managers some latitude to favor friendly bidders over
hostile ones.18
Finally, while our central argument is based on intuitive arguments
and economic theory, it is nonetheless important to assess its “Þt” by
situating our analysis within existing empirical knowledge about corporate governance. As we demonstrate below, many of our arguments may
provide a useful explanation of a number of quandaries within corporate scholarship. Some recent studies, for example, have found that the
inclusion or preclusion of anti-takeover protections in an initial charter
does not appear to be “priced out” in the form of a discount at the IPO
stage.19 While some have interpreted these Þndings as evidence of irrationality – or at least inattentiveness – within capital markets, our
analysis suggests a possible more systematic explanation: That market
participants accurately priced both the costs of antitakeover protections
(realized at the takeover stage) and their beneÞts (realized further upstream, at the embedded defense stage). Under this view, the net eﬀect
of such measures may be both indeterminate and empirically insignificant. Additionally, our Þndings may help shed light on other studies
that Þnd executive incentive compensation to be negatively related to
takeover impediments.20
This remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines
the existing debate over shareholder choice and determines the limits of
shareholder choice. It then reveals a previously unexamined zone of
unregulable pre-bid embedded defenses.21 Section 3 establishes the
existence of a wide variety of existing pre-bid embedded defenses that
managers would employ to deter bids, free from eﬀective court oversight.
Section 4 summarizes our Þndings that shareholder choice would induce
managers to adopt value-reducing pre-bid embedded defenses that they
would not otherwise adopt. Section 5 presents a more formal analysis
of shareholder choice. Section 6 discusses the beneÞts of employing a
18

This paper does not determine the optimal scope of such a rule. Its central
contribution is to introduce an additional consideration that must be taken into
account in the design of an optimal shareholder choice rule.
19
Daines & Klausner; Klausner (Penn Symposium Piece).
20
Kieth Harvey & Ronald Shrieves, Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Governance Choices, __ Journal of Financial Research __ (2003) (Þnding, for
example, that the relative absence of directors is negatively related to high powered
incentive compensation).
21
See infra note .
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hybrid regime. Section 7 provides some empirical support in support of
out Þndings. Section 8 concludes.

2

DeÞning the Limits of Shareholder Choice

This section examines more speciÞcally the arguments favoring shareholder choice. While the various incarnations of this approach are far
from homogeneous, we argue that there are nonetheless at least a few
guiding principles that limit the domain of authority that shareholders
can justiÞably claim over takeover decisions. For instance, we argue
that even the strongest proponents of shareholder choice would likely
stop short of advocating shareholder scrutiny in decisions pertaining to
ordinary course of business (i.e., long before a bid is imminent) that may
nonetheless have the eﬀect of deterring certain types of takeovers. Yet to
the extent this zone remains unregulated, adoption of shareholder choice
may simply cause managers to switch from existing defenses into these
unregulated defenses. This could have adverse consequences for Þrms.22

2.1

Managerial Control versus Shareholder Choice

Corporate law scholars generally subscribe to the proposition that professional management of corporations is usually superior to shareholder
management of everyday business decisions. In the case of everyday
business transactions, disaggregated shareholders have neither the incentives to acquire – nor the capacity to analyze – the information
needed to make good business decisions.23 Moreover, even when shareholders are in possession of all relevant information, a host of related
22

Indeed, both U.S. proposals and European law both fall short of regulating most
pre-bid defenses. Although the U.K.’s City Code tightly restricts managers’ ability
to implement ”defensive measures” once a takeover bid is imminent, it does not
regulate managers’ adoption of ”protective measures” implements well in advance of
a takeover. In response, many European, especially Continental companies, adopted
strong protective devices that signiÞcantly impede takeovers. Eddy Wymeersch,
Problems of the Regulation of Takeover Bids in Western Europe: A Comparative
Study, in European Takeovers: Law and Practice, 95, 122 (Klaus Hopt & Eddy
Wymeersch, eds.) (1992); see infra note __ [discussing Golden Share arrangements].
Moreover, Europe’s experience with the 13th Directive reveals some of the diﬃculties associated with pre-bid defenses. Germany’s veto of the proposed 13th Directive
in December, 2001 was in part based on the claim that it was not a good idea to regulate post-bid defenses if pre-bid defenses remained unregulated. Subsequent eﬀorts
to address this issue by the High Level Group of Company Law Experts appointed by
the European Commission would somewhat reduce the problem of pre-bid defenses,
while leaving untouched the main group of pre-bid defenses identiÞed in this paper.
23
Indeed, the very reason publicly held corporations exist is to exploit the advantages of vesting control of the Þrm in professional managers who do not own the
Þrm.
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coordination and collective action problems conspire to plague collective
decision making.24
While few corporate law scholars would contest this general proposition, there is considerably more debate about the degree to which it
applies to managers’ adoption of takeover defenses. Proponents managerial control over takeovers argue that the same concerns are equally
applicable in the takeover context. Shareholders are not suﬃciently well
informed about the future value of the Þrm to evaluate a takeover bid,
and do not have the requisite incentives to obtain the necessary information, they argue. Moreover, even if shareholders are informed, they
likely lack the capacity and business acumen to evaluate it properly.
Consequently, proponents contend, shareholders are far better oﬀ vesting authority over tender oﬀers in the hands of expert managers (just as
they do with other decisions).25
By contrast, shareholder choice proponents concede the desirability
of professional management in ordinary business transactions,26 but contend that in the context of a tender oﬀer the costs of professional management exceed its beneÞts. In particular, because hostile acquisitions
frequently presage managerial turnover,27 managers can become con24

See generally Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law (1991).
25
See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 Bus.
Law. 101 (1970); Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 1037 (2002): see also Kahan & Rock, supra note , at __ [around note 30]
(discussing the view of ”Hamiltonian” corporate scholars who assert that managerial
decisionmaking is better because they have private information about future value
than cannot optimally or eﬀectively be shared with shareholders); Bernard Black
& Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden
Value, 96 Nw. Univ. L. Rev 521 (2002) (hidden value justiÞes some managerial
power to defend).
Some scholars present arguments for board control for reasons other than relative shareholder incompetence at evaluating takeover bids. E.g., Marcel Kahan
& Edward Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions As
Pre-Commitment, U. Penn. L. Rev. (2003) (shareholders may precommit to granting boards control over tender oﬀers because boards are better able to implement
a selling strategy); Lynn Stout, [this issue] (commitment to board veto power may
promote team production) [To ed: can I see the most recent version of this article];
see also Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L.
Rev. 111 (1987) (certain antitakeover provisions may beneÞt small shareholders).
26
For example, Lucian Bebchuk, who probably takes the most expansive view
of the proper scope of shareholder authority nevertheless accepts the importance
of professional managerial control over general business operations (as opposed to
charter amendments and mergers). See Lucian Bebchuk, Empowering Shareholders
(unpublished 2003).
27
E.g. Kenneth Martin & John McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate
Takeovers, and Management Turnover, 46 J. Finance 671 (1991).
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sumed with self-preservation,28 either resisting hostile deals altogether
or favoring ‘friendly’ acquisitions that provide managers with either continued job security or an attractive buyout (at shareholders’ expense).
This not only can reduce shareholder welfare ex post, it also reduces
it ex ante by muting the disciplining eﬀect of the market for corporate
control.29 Accordingly, they argue, control over the corporate decision
making regarding tender oﬀers should devolve to shareholders if, and
to the extent that, shareholders can be relied upon to make informed
judgments concerning tender oﬀers, proponents of shareholder choice
argue.30
Scholars seeking to deÞne the limits of shareholder choice generally
agree that shareholder choice should not supplant managerial control
unless shareholders can be expected to be suﬃciently well informed to
make the requisite business decisions. Thus, in this view, the proper contours of shareholder choice depends on shareholders’ incentives to obtain
and capacity to evaluate the information necessary to choose between
the hostile tender oﬀer and the option presented by management’s defenses (e.g., leaving the target as is). As takeover defenses vary in their
complexity, and shareholder choice proponents diﬀer in their faith in
shareholder decision making capacity, shareholder choice proposals also
vary in their view as to when shareholders should be permitted to invalidate managers’ defenses in order to accept a hostile oﬀer.

2.2

The Scope of Shareholder Choice

To assess shareholder decision making capacity, it is useful to distinguish
takeover defenses based on two criteria: (1) whether the defense is a pure
28

E.g., James Cotter & Marc Zenner, How Managerial Wealth Aﬀects the Tender
Oﬀer Process, 35 J. Fin. Econ. 63 (1994) (oﬀering empirical support for the claim
that managerial resistance to tender oﬀers appears to be driven by managers’ selfinterest, rather than shareholders’ interests); Ralph Walking & Michael Long, Agency
Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance, 15 RAND J. Econ. 54
(1984) (same).
29
E.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 973 (2002).
30
Scholars who advocate some form of shareholder choice include, e.g., Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Oﬀers, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
1028 (1982); Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan.
L. Rev. 887, 949 (200); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover
Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521 (2002);
Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Oﬀer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981); Ronald Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Oﬀers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819 (1981).
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defense (that only aﬀects the likely success of a hostile oﬀer) or is an
embedded defense that is incorporated into a business transaction that
might be in the Þrm’s best interests notwithstanding the tender oﬀer;
and (2) whether the defense is adopted in the course of an ordinary
business transaction (with no imminent or existing bid) or in response
to an actual or imminent bid. This permits us to represent the defenses
that managers may employ a two-by-two matrix, pictured in Table 1
below. In the matrix, the eﬀect of the defense is represented on the
vertical axis while the timing of the defense is on the horizontal axis:

Ordinary
Business
Pure
Poison
PoisonPill;
Pill;Classified
Classified
Defensive
Board;
Board;Staggered
Staggered
Board
Purpose
Board

Embedded
Defense

Poison
PoisonPill;
Pill;
Greenmail;
Greenmail;Defensive
Defensive
Redemptions;
Redemptions;Blank
Blank
Check
CheckPreferred
Preferredwith
with
hostile-only
hostile-onlytriggers
triggers
Spin
SpinOffs;
Offs;M&A
M&A
Activity;
Activity;White
White
Knights
Knights

“X”
“X”

SH Information

Post-Bid

SH Information
Table 1: A Simple Taxonomy of Defenses
Moving from left to right along the horizontal axis — i.e., from pre-bid
defenses taken in the “ordinary course of business” to post-bid defenses
— likely correlates to a move towards greater shareholder information.
Indeed, shareholder choice proponents themselves generally base their
claims for shareholder authority over post-bid defenses in part on the
grounds that shareholders’ incentives and ability to obtain and evaluate
information increase dramatically once a bid has emerged.31 A takeover
bid occurs rarely in the life of a Þrm and has enormous potential consequences for shareholders. These high stakes provide shareholders with
adequate incentives to become informed. Moreover, shareholders’ costs
of obtaining information are likely lower post-bid than in the course of
ordinary business transactions because the heat of a tender oﬀer results
in scrutiny by arbitrageurs, investors, research analysts and the press.
Moreover, shareholders’ decision making capacity may be greater because Þrms subject to tender oﬀers often end up with proportionately
31

E.g., Bebchuk, supra note [chi l rev]; see Gilson, supra note .
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more informed investors, such as arbitrageurs, investment banks and institutional investors. Thus, while shareholders generally cannot make
business decisions in the ordinary course of business, they can do so in
the heated crucible of the post-bid environment.32
A move from bottom to top along the vertical axis — from embedded
defenses to pure defenses — also represents a move towards a decision
shareholders have greater capacity to make. A "pure defense" is a measure whose only purpose and eﬀect is to deter hostile bids. Thus, an
eﬀective pure defense has the equivalent eﬀect on Þrm value of granting
managers a similarly eﬀective veto right over tender oﬀers. A classic
example of such a measure is the poison pill, which has no eﬀect on Þrm
value except to the extent that it discourages hostile acquisitions.33 The
second type of defense is an embedded (or mixed-motive) defense. Embedded defenses are actions the board purports to take for legitimate
(non-defensive) business reasons that also have the eﬀect of deterring
tender oﬀers (either hostile bids or generally). The decision by a board
to spin-oﬀ a subsidiary, or to merge with a Þrm other than the hostile
bidder, are examples of embedded defenses. These measures do aﬀect
Þrm value independent of any eﬀect on the hostile bid.34 The eﬀect,
moreover, may be positive or negative.
Shareholders’ capacity to assert authority over a tender oﬀer is lower
when the Þrm has an embedded defense than when it has a pure defense because the decision to overturn an embedded defense imposes far
greater informational demands on shareholders. To select between a
tender oﬀer and maintenance of a pure defense, shareholders need only
compare the merits of the acquirer’s bid against their best estimate of
the value of the status quo. I such situations, when management is
seeking to maintain status quo against a raider, shareholders can obtain relatively good information about company value by analyzing the
existing prospects that Þrm enjoys. Furthermore, even in the case of
pre-bid pure defenses, shareholders can wait to evaluate the defense until after a tender oﬀer has materialized, since, by deÞnition, the pure
defense neither imposes legitimate reliance interests in third parties, nor
32

E.g., Bebchuk, supra note ([chicago piece]
The poison pill discourages acquisitions by causing the Þrm to disgorge value
to non-acquirer holders of the Þrm’s securities when an acquiring Þrm crosses a
pre-speciÞed threshold level of ownership. Poison pills are designed to discourage
acquiror from obtaining the triggering ownership amount, and thus are not triggered.
Cf. William Carney & Leonard Silverstein, The Illusory Protections of the Poison
Pill (unpublished manuscript) (questioning whether acquirors should be so wary of
triggering pills).
34
This includes that such defenses may deter both hostile and friendly deals alike.
See infra Section 3.
33
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does it impose irreversible sunk costs on the company. Accordingly,
shareholders can evaluate pure defenses in the informationally-rich context subsequent to a bid.35
By contrast, to evaluate the merits of
an embedded defense, shareholders must compare the value of a tender
oﬀer bid against the value of the Þrm as altered (indeed restructured)
by the embedded defense. This comparison imposes far greater requirements on shareholders, forcing them to anticipate not only the future
trajectory of the Þrm (which may change after the embedded defense is
installed). Moreover, the informational demands are ampliÞed further
when the embedded defense is adopted at a pre-bid stage, as it would
force shareholders to forecast the probability, timing and value of some
future tender oﬀer under the status quo.
The matrix above can be used to delineate the debate among shareholder choice proposals as to the proper scope of shareholder choice.
Most choice advocates agree that the case for shareholder choice is
strongest when managers seek to employ pure defenses.36 Indeed, most
choice proponents would agree that given managerial agency costs on
the one hand, and shareholders’ strong incentives and capacity to obtain good information on the other, managers should not be permitted to
maintain such pure defenses to thwart a hostile oﬀer. Perhaps the only
circumstances under which managers should be allowed to maintain a
pure defense, advocates argue, are when it is used to as bargaining leverage negotiate a better deal for shareholders. Once the raider has made
its tender oﬀer, proponents contend, management should be required to
submit the decision to shareholders and should be forced to remove all
pure defenses if shareholders vote to approve the deal.37
35

E.g., Bebchuk, supra note .But see Kahan & Rock, supra note , at __ [around
note 30] (discussing the view of ”Hamiltonian” corporate scholars who assert that
managerial decisionmaking is better because they have private information about future value than cannot optimally or eﬀectively be shared with shareholders); Bernard
Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. Univ. L. Rev 521 (2002) (hidden value justiÞes some managerial
power to defend).
36
In the case of the poison pill, there is no distinction between pre-bid and postbid pure defenses because even if the pill is adopted pre-bid, the board must decide
whether to redeem the pill post-bid.
37
E.g., Bebchuk, supra note ; Gilson, supra note . A debate within shareholder
choice concerns whether shareholders should decide the fate of a raider’s oﬀer by
tendering their shareholders or by a shareholder vote. Compare Ronald Gilson &
Alan Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methods for Transferring Corporate Control,
2 Theo. Inq. in L. 783, 790-92 (2001) (straight tender oﬀer is preferable to requiring
shareholder voting on tender oﬀers), with Bebchuk, supra note [chi] (shareholder
voting on tenders oﬀers is preferable to deciding through the tender oﬀer process).
One milder proposal that favors shareholder voting holds that boards should be
permitted to use a poison pill to ”Just Say Not Now,” but not to ”Just Say No,
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Embedded defenses, on the other hand, present a more diﬃcult issue for shareholder choice advocates. Indeed, advocates are largely divided on whether shareholders should be given authority to invalidate
embedded defenses even when adopted after a hostile bid is imminent.
Post-bid, embedded defenses are actions that the board arguably could
adopt, within its business judgment, even were there no hostile bid, such
as a post-bid corporate restructuring or defensive mergers with another
Þrm. In other words, they may serve legitimate non-defensive business
purposes, in addition to deterring a hostile bid. These decisions place
greater demand on shareholder decision making capacity because they
require shareholders to choose between the tender oﬀer bid and remaining with a Þrm that will be altered by the embedded defense. In other
words, shareholders must evaluate the future prospects of a Þrm which
has no controlling history — only aspirations and expectations.38
Notwithstanding these added informational problems, at least some
commentators advocate granting shareholders veto power to defeat such
defenses. Those who take this position conclude that managers are so
infected by self interest once a bid has occurred that they cannot be
left in control of those business decisions that can be used to defeat a
hostile oﬀer. Moreover, as noted above, shareholders likely have a greater
capacity to make such business decisions at the post-bid stage than in
the course of ordinary business.39 Accordingly, these scholars conclude
that once a hostile bid is imminent, shareholders, not the board, should
have the ultimate authority to decide the fate of post-bid embedded
defenses.40
Never.” Under this proposal, the board could maintain the pill in the face of a
hostile oﬀer unless, and until, the raider mounts, and wins, a proxy contest. If
the raider wins the proxy contest, then the board should be forced to remove the
pill, even if the raider did not gain control of the entire board because the board is
staggered. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The
Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. Univ. L. Rev. 521 (2002).
38
The greater the impact of the embedded defense, the more diﬃcult it will be for
shareholders to compare the merits of the Þrm with defense to the value oﬀered in
the bid. For defenses that do little to alter the existing Þrm, shareholders may be
similarly situated to shareholders facing a pure defense. For those Þrms considering
a real change, like a merger with a similarly-sized or larger Þrm, it is considerably
more diﬃcult for shareholders to evaluate the future of the target in the new world
ocassioned by the defense.
39
See supra text accompanying notes _-_ [para. on pre-bid vs post-bid]
40
This is can be made operational through several means. For example, boards
contemplating a business decision that would defeat the hostile bid could submit the
decision to shareholders as to whether to accept the bid or proceed with management
new business plan. In doing so, managers can provide shareholders with information
and arguments supporting their preferred course of action. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra
note ; Gilson, supra note . But see Black & Kraakman, supra note (discussing the
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2.3

The Unexamined Fourth Quadrant

Existing scholarship promoting shareholder choice generally has assumed
that if shareholders have suﬃcient capacity to evaluate the relative merits of a tender oﬀer bid and a defense, shareholders should be granted
authority to make this decision. This focus on shareholder capacity has
led those with the greatest faith in shareholder decision making to favor a
particularly strong form of shareholder choice which grants shareholders
authority to determine the fate of all pure defenses and (less commonly)
all post-bid embedded defenses.41 Yet, in focusing on these defenses,
shareholder choice proponents have paid little attention to the southwest
— or fourth — quadrant in Table 1: the pre-bid embedded defense.42 Even
problem of hidden value and proposing a more moderate rule).
41
See Bebchuk, supra note [chi article]
42
A few scholars have observed that the shareholder choice might induce managers
to employ substitute defenses, but they generally have not explore the degree to which
this possibility does indeed undermine the case for shareholder choice. E.g., Jennifer
Arlen, Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting,
Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, 69 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev, 917,
920, 928 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Low the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 871,
903 (2002) (”as long as board retain the power to manage the company...a unilateral
board-opposed governance measure is likely to induce a strategic response by the
board.”) see also Atreya Chakraborty & Richard Arnott, Takeover Defenses and
Diluation: A Welfare Analysis, 36 J. Fin. & Quan. Analysis 311 (2001) (suggesting
hostiles may provide less disciplining eﬀect than theory suggests in that the primary
gain from hostile tender oﬀers may be to undue the eﬀects of value-reducing defenses
that managers would not adopt if not subject to the threat of hostile oﬀers); cf.
Ronald Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes,
73 Va. L. Rev. 807 (1987)(concluding that examination of dual class common stock
requires consideration of substitutes that accomplish the same result); Ronald Gilson,
The Claim Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the
Enabling Concept, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 775 (1981-1982)(recognizing the impact of
unregulated pre-bid shark repellents on the merits of regulating post-bid defenses,
but not considering the impact of pre-bid embedded defenses on the merits of pre-bid
regulating shark repellents). Previous analyzes have not examined the breadth of
available pre-bid embedded defenses nor whether managers can be expected to adopt
these substitutes, even if doing so could decrease the probability of friendly deals.
Concern that managers subject to extensive regulation of pure defenses and postbid defenses simply induce managers to substitute into pre-bid defenses (otherwise
known as preventive measures) has dominated much of the European debate over
takeover law. E.g., Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Chap. 7, Control Transactions, in
The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2002)
(A weakness of existing EU shareholder choice proposals is that they regulate postbid defenses, yet management can act eﬀectively against potential oﬀers in advance
of any particular oﬀer materializing. ”However, to apply a pre-bid requirement of
shareholder approval... would be too great an interfernece with the operation of
centralised management.”). To our knowledge, these analyses have not examined
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under the strongest shareholder choice proposals, managers’ authority
to employ most pre-bid embedded defenses remains unchallenged.43
In many respects, the scholarly neglect of the fourth quadrant is perfectly understandable, for at least two reasons. First, the use of pre-bid,
embedded defenses is not particularly common under existing law. As
noted above, Delaware law currently grants managers enormous discretion to fashion much more tailored takeover defenses: managers who are
not selling control of the Þrm, for example, can employ defenses in any
of the four quadrants to “Just Say No” to an acquirer.44 Given this
discretion to employ defenses in any quadrant of the matrix, managers
can be expected to favor those defenses that deter an unwanted bid at
minimal cost. This suggests that managers should favor pure defenses.
These defenses are eﬀective against hostile bids45 and yet preserve managers’ ability to enter into friendly deals, with their associated gains to
management. Moreover, pure defenses — especially those with targeted
eﬀects (such as the poison pill) — deter hostile bids without otherwise
negatively aﬀecting company structure or operations.46 By contrast, at
present embedded defenses are more costly because, by deÞnition, they
alter the Þrm’s operations or structures in ways management would not
agree to but for the fear of a hostile takeover. Thus they are potentially
the welfare implications of substitution for shareholder choice, as in this Article.
43
E.g., Bebchuk, supra note [chi]; see supra note __ (discussing Europe).
Although choice proponents have not examined pre-bid embedded defenses general, some scholars have particular individual pre-bid embedded defenses. E.g., Jeﬀ
Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, Colum. L. Rev. [get full cite][chk]; Joel Seligman, Equal Protection
in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controvery, 54
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 687, 724 (1986) (dual class structures should be prohibited for
companies registered under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
see also Kahan & Klausner, supra note (questioning the legitimacy of debt covenants
with change of control puts triggered only by a hostile oﬀer).
44
See Time/Warner; QVC; Unitrin. This is not to say that they can employ
whatever defense they choose within each quadrant. Limits do exist. See, e.g.,
Quickturn. But managers have available to them valid defenses in each of the
quadrants.
45
See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note .
46
Indeed, the poison pill has several advantages over other defenses in this quadrant
(such as defensive share redemptions or greenmail). First, the poison pill — particularly when combined with a classiÞed and/or staggered board — is a very eﬀective
defense. A hostile raider faces little chance of over-coming this combined defense.
Second, the pill is targeted in purpose and eﬀect. The pill is targetted in purpose
in that the pill is redeemable by the board and thus can be targeted to hostile bids
without aﬀecting friendly deals. The pill is targeted in eﬀect in that has no operating
eﬀect, aside from deterring a hostile bid (assuming it is never triggered). Thus the
pill deters hostile raiders without requiring an expenditure by the Þrm. This makes
it superior to share redemptions, green mail, and other such measures.
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more destructive of Þrm value. Moreover, some embedded defenses may
deter not only hostile bids but also friendly deals as well.47 This lowers managers’ welfare as managers generally can expect to proÞt from
a friendly deal. Accordingly, under existing law, managers generally
should avoid embedded defenses except as a last resort. Moreover, when
they do employ embedded defenses, they can be expected to favor postbid embedded defenses which they can implement only when a takeover
is imminent. Given their existing authority, managers have little reason
to favor strong pre-bid embedded defenses that may be more destructive of Þrm value (including the ability to do friendly deals) than is the
poison pill.48
Nevertheless, the fact that managers currently do not rely regularly
on pre-bid embedded defenses does not mean that their existence can be
ignored when evaluating the merits of shareholder choice. Indeed, the
normative case for shareholder choice may turn crucially on the viability
of this fourth quadrant, and speciÞcally on whether managers would
respond to greater shareholder interference by simply substituting into
pre-bid embedded defenses.49
This is a potentially serious concern, for shareholder choice proposals do not remove managers’ incentives to entrench themselves or ensure
managerial passivity. All they do is regulate certain forms of managerial entrenchment: the use of pure and post-bid defenses. Managers
would retain other methods of entrenchment, under proposed shareholder choice regimes: pre-bid embedded defenses. Moreover, managers
could be expected to employ these unregulated defenses to protect their
tenure. Thus, rather than simply ceding their discretion, we argue,
managers subject to shareholder choice may simply relocate their retrenchment activities further upstream, embedding defenses in pre-bid
47

See infra Section 3 (discussing blanket defenses).
Nevertheless, even under current law managers may employ pre-bid embedded
defenses that are truly targetted only at hostile deals. See Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management
Entrenchment, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 931 (1993) (discussing managements’ defensive use
of penalty change of control provisions in bond covenants triggered only by a hostile
oﬀer in the years before the RJR-Nabisco deal). Nevertheless, the pill coupled with
the eﬀective classiÞed board generally will be more eﬀective than such measures, and
appears to have supplanted them. See Id. (discussing the decreased use of such
targetted defenses post RJR-Nabisco); Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note
(discussing the rise of, and eﬀectiveness of, the poison pill coupled with an eﬀective
classiÞed board).
49
In other words, we argue that shareholder capacity to make the decisions required
to override NE, NW and SE quadrant defenses is a necessary, but not a suﬃcient,
condition to establish that shareholder authority in those quadrants is value enhancing.
48
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decisions that arguably have non-retrenchment justiÞcations.50
The possibility of board substitution into pre-bid embedded defenses
signiÞcantly aﬀects the merits of shareholder choice proposals because
these defenses cannot simply be regulated away by expanding the scope
of shareholder choice. The possibility of substitution is particularly troubling because many pre-bid embedded defenses are likely to be more
costly for the Þrm than are pure defenses. Thus shareholder choice
might only increase the cost to Þrms of entrenchment measures without
signiÞcantly reducing their eﬀectiveness.
Pre-bid embedded defenses are extraordinarily diﬃcult to regulate
because (1) they are adopted within the abstract, information-poor context of everyday business, often far before a tender oﬀer might ever
emerge; and (2) they ostensibly serve legitimate business interests and
may confer beneÞts on the Þrm that exceed any negative eﬀects associated with their eﬀect on takeovers. Courts, therefore, cannot blithely
prohibit such measures, nor can they easily evaluate them on a case-bycase basis. In order to preserve the value of these measures to the Þrm,
courts (or shareholders) would need to assess their validity at the time
they were adopted (or establish rules that enable shareholders to predict
their validity at the moment of contracting).51 Yet neither shareholders
nor courts are particularly good at rendering such judgments. Indeed,
in order to evaluate such defenses one would need to compare the ex50

See supra note . [other scholars] Our analysis of managerial substitution into
substitute unregulable defenses can be viewed as an extension to the issue of legal
regulation of regulable and unregulable actions of the insights gleaned from the literature on multi-tasking concerning the limits of incentive contracts based on objective
measures of agents’ output when agents take observable and nonobservable actions.
Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J. Law, Econ. & Organ. 24 (1991).
51
Although the validity of some of these defenses could be determined ex post, the
validity of most of them cannot eﬀectively be determined ex post without adversely
aﬀecting Þrm value. The value to the Þrm of many pre-bid embedded defenses depends on the corporation knowing that they are enforceable. This is particularly
true of embedded defenses that grant rights to third parties that aﬀect third parties
willingness to contract with the corporation, as well as the contract price. Accordingly, courts could not assess their validity on an ex post basis without seriously
undermining their value to the Þrm.
Moreover, assessing their validity ex post would not solve the information problem
The proper measure of the validity of pre-bid embedded measures is whether the
measure plausibly enhanced Þrm value at the time is was adopted, when the threat
of a hostile bid was an unknown probability and not a certainty. For the reasons
discussed below, courts could no better do this than they could make any of the other
business decisions that most corporate scholars conclude courts are ill-equipped to
make. Cf. Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Econommic Structure of
Corporate Law, Chap. (1991)(discussing the beneÞts of the Business Judgement
Rule).
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pected beneÞts of the embedded defense against their expected costs
in terms of deterring future bids at the time the defense was adopted.
This inquiry is fraught with speculation, possible error, and complexity
even for the business executives who made the decision. Shareholders
and courts are likely to be even worse at performing such comparisons.
Thus, arguments favoring professional management and the Business
Judgment Rule more generally would operate with particular force to
counsel against aggressive shareholder or court oversight of most pre-bid
embedded defenses.52

3

Availability of Pre-Bid Embedded Defenses

The case for shareholder choice accordingly depends in part on whether
managers could be expected to respond to a shareholder choice regime
by employing pre-bid embedded defenses, all else equal. It is therefore
important to establish that such actions are both available and plausible
as a practical matter. This section examines existing corporate practices
to determine whether potent pre-bid embedded defenses are practically
available to managers. We Þnd a cornucopia of alternative pre-bid embedded measures that managers could employ either to retain control
or deter acquisitions should they be prevented from employing pure defenses or post-bid defenses.53 Moreover, this section reveals that courts
could not prohibit — or invalidate — these measures without potentially
reducing many Þrms’ value because many of these defenses serve legitimate non-defensive business goals for some Þrms, providing these Þrms
beneÞts that justify their costs.54
52
Even the strongest proponent of shareholder authority accept that shareholders
should not be vested with the authority to determine everyday business transactions,
such as third party contracts. See Lucian Bebchuk, Empowering Shareholders,
Harvard Working Paper (2003).
53
Such as the one proposed by Bebchuk, supra note .
Board eﬀorts to retain control need not be limited to rearranging internal corporate
aﬀairs. Managers can be expected to respond to any eﬀort by the Delaware Court
to implement shareholder choice by seeking antitakeover protection from legislators.
This could take the form of lobbying the Delaware legislature for stronger antitakeover
protections. Alternatively, it could take the form of remaining in, or opting into,
other states with stronger antitakeover protections. Cf. Guhan Subramanian, The
Inßuence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the ”Race”
Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, Harvard NOM Research Paper No. 01-10
(December 2001) (evidence suggests that managers migrate to, and avoid migrating
away from, states with stronger — though not super strong — antitakeover protections).
54
Nor can shareholders rely on non-legal restraints on managers’ behavior — such as
the threat of a proxy contest or outside directors — to deter managers from adopting
such value-reducing measures. The case for shareholder choice itself is predicated
on the idea that neither the proxy process nor outside directors place suﬃcient constraints on managers to deter them from taking actions that beneÞt themselves at the
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3.1

Targeted Versus Blanket Embedded Defenses

To evaluate the risk of managerial substitution into pre-bid embedded
defenses it is necessary to distinguish these defenses based on their deterrent eﬀect, the cost to the Þrm of their adoption, and the ease with
which courts or shareholders could regulate their use. Viewed from this
perspective, it is helpful to distinguish between two diﬀerent types of
pre-bid embedded defenses. The Þrst are "targeted" embedded defenses,
that eﬀectively give the managers control over which bid succeeds without imposing any costs on friendly deals. Targeted embedded defenses
thus only deter hostile tender oﬀers, leaving the Þrm’s ability to enter
into a friendly transaction unchanged. A debt covenant with a change
of control put triggered only by a hostile acquisition is an example of a
targeted pre-bid embedded defense. The second category are "blanket"
embedded defenses. These are measures that could deter any corporate
combination. A blanket embedded defense include debt covenants with
a change of control put triggered by any corporate combination, friendly
or hostile.
Managers subject to shareholder choice would Þnd targeted defenses
particularly attractive as they would enable them to deter hostile oﬀers
while maintaining their ability to enter into friendly deals. Of course,
these defenses also are the least likely to serve bona Þde non-defensive
interests, and thus are the most vulnerable to court regulation. Nevertheless, this section will show that many targeted defenses would be difÞcult for courts to regulate. To the extent managers are able to employ
these defenses, shareholder choice would do little to achieve increased
shareholder control over hostile acquisitions.
The second type of defense, blanket defenses, increases the costs of
all acquisitions. Such defenses thus potentially deter hostile and friendly
deals alike, and therefore impose greater costs on both managers and
shareholders than targeted pure defenses, such as the poison pill, that
expense of shareholders. To the extent that this view is correct, it should also apply
to managers’ use of pre-bid embedded defenses to deter unwanted oﬀers. Moreover, many of the pre-bid embedded defenses we examine are particularly unsuited
to regulation through the discipline of shareholder voting. Shareholders incentives
to change management depend on the change producing a suﬃcient improvement in
Þrm value to outweigh the costs of a proxy contest. To the extent that management
adopts eﬀective pre-bid embedded defenses but otherwise successfully attempts to
maximize Þrm value, shareholders would have little to gain from replacing them.
Unlike the poison pill, changing management would not change the deterrent eﬀect
of many of the pre-bid embedded defenses we outline because many are contained in
contracts that management no longer controls. Thus, shareholders cannot eliminate
these defenses by changing management. See infra note __ (discussing change of
control provisions).
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impede hostile deals alone. This section will show that although blanket
defenses are more costly, they generally also would be more diﬃcult for
courts to regulate. Managers are better able to assert that blanket defenses serve a legitimate non-defensive business purpose because, while
there are few legitimate non-defensive reasons to condition a transaction
on whether a tender oﬀer is hostile, there are many legitimate reasons
to condition a corporate transaction on a change of control generally.
Managers’ claim that such provisions serve a legitimate purpose is enhanced by the price managers pay for adopting blanket defenses: blanket defenses also deter friendly deals.55 Accordingly, even under the
strongest shareholder choice regime, courts should be reluctant to invalidate these measures ex ante, for fear that many companies would
be hurt — precluded from entering into value-enhancing arrangements to
preserve shareholder control of a tender oﬀer that might never arise. Nor
should courts simply reserve judgment until after a bid has materialized.
Ex post decision making by courts would undermine the value of many
of these arrangements by leaving their validity uncertain.56 Finally, the
problem of pre-bid defenses — and in particular blanket pre-bid defenses
— cannot be resolved by requiring ex ante shareholder vote on all pre-bid
embedded defenses. Shareholders would have to evaluate these transactions in the cool climate of ordinary business, when shareholders have
neither suﬃcient incentive nor capacity to make the complex business
decisions entailed in determining whether the beneÞts associated with
a pre-bid defense exceeds the expected costs of deterring a potential
takeover.57
55

See supra note __ [prior note].
The problem with ex post evaluation of pre-bid defenses is worse than those surrounding ex post analysis of post-bid embedded defenses under the existing regime.
First, at present, managers can employ a wide variety of post-bid embedded defenses
quite certain of how the court will rule. Second, many post-bid embedded defenses
only aﬀect parties to the takeover contest. Thus, any uncertainty surrounding postbid defenses only aﬀects contracting behavior during a takeover contest. By contrast, pre-bid defenses are embedded in many everyday business transactions. Thus,
uncertainty regarding the validity of pre-bid defenses would aﬀect a wide range of
transctions. Finally, the duration of the uncerainty and the possibility of managers possessing private information is less in the case of post-bid defenses, because
post-bid it is clear that a bid has happened and that the court will evaluate the
transaction. Defenses adopted pre-bid may not be evaluated for years; moreover,
managers may have private information on the likelihood of an acquisition, which
further complicaties contracting over such clauses when their validity is uncertain.
57
The business decisions associated with many of the blanket pre-bid defenses we
discuss — such as change of control provisions — are likely to be even more complex
than those associated with shareholder approval of many shark repellents (such as
fair price provisions) to the extent that the beneÞts of the former are entail more
Þrm speciÞc considerations. Corporate scholars have suggested that ordinary share56

22

The next two parts discuss examples of pre-bid embedded defenses
that managers might be able to use to entrench themselves. In discussing
speciÞc examples of managers’ use of these defenses, we are not claiming
that managers in these cases employed embedded defenses primarily to
entrench themselves at the expense of their Þrms. Just the opposite. In
the case of many of the pre-bid embedded defenses we discuss we expect
that managers employed these defenses in situations where they beneÞtted the Þrm. This is particularly likely in the case of blanket defenses.
After all, under current law, managers seeking takeover defenses need
not resort to expensive blanket measures to entrench themselves; they
can entrench themselves eﬀectively at lower cost by adopting a pure defenses, such as the poison pill and eﬀective classiÞed board.58 Yet while
managers in the cases we discussed likely employed such defenses to the
net beneÞt of their Þrms, managers could employ the embedded defenses
catalogued here to entrench themselves at their Þrms’ expense, if precluded from using other lower cost defenses. Thus, the examples we
discuss illustrate that (1) potent embedded defenses exist; (2) legitimate
business reasons do exist for many of these defenses such that regulating
them could hurt many Þrms and (3) managers who want to use these
measures to entrench themselves can do so under circumstances where
the costs may exceed the beneÞts. Moreover, while under existing law
managers can be expected to design pre-bid embedded defenses in ways
that minimize their adverse consequences for friendly tender oﬀers, managers subject to shareholder choice would have good reason to modify
standard pre-bid embedded defenses to increase their deterrent eﬀect.59
If this occurs, shareholder choice could reduce Þrm value by causing
managers to employ defenses that impose greater costs than do existing
holders may not have suﬃcient incentive and capacity to make even the more simply
decisions associated with shark repellent amendments, and institutional shareholders
tend not to intervene on issues that are corporation-speciÞc, as compared corporate governance issues where a given rule outcome likely applies to most Þrms. Cf.
Gilson, supra note [shark repellent] (discussing problems associated with vesting
control over shark repellent amendments in shareholders).
58
Pure defenses are lower cost because they defend managers from a hostile bid
without distoring Þrm value. Moreover, in contrast with ”blanket” embedded defenses (which deter all deals), pure defenses are targeted only at hostile deals. Postbid embedded defenses are lower cost than similar pre-bid defenses because the Þrm
only bears the cost of the defensive measure if a bid occurs. Also, in contrast with
”blanket” pre-bid embedded defenses, post-bid embedded defenses can be targeted
to only hostile deals.
59
While we focus on existing defenses, it is important to remember that these
would not be the board’s only options. The history of takeover defenses is one
characterized by continual innovation in the face of necessity as boards endeavour to
devise mechanisms for retaining control over takeovers in the face of periodic eﬀorts
by the courts to regulate board control.
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Table 2: Examples of Pre-Bid Defenses

3.2

Targeted Defenses

Managers subject to a shareholder choice regime that eliminates their
ability to deter hostile bids through pure defenses or post-bid embedded defenses potentially could employ a variety of pre-bid embedded
defenses that enable them to retain control of the tender oﬀer process.
Through these defenses, managers thus could deter hostile bids and yet
permit the friendly acquisitions which often yield considerable managerial proÞt. As previously discussed, courts could readily invalidate many
pre-bid targeted defenses without concern that they are interfering with
otherwise legitimate business arrangements. Yet managers would retain
the authority to employ others that courts could not so easily invalidate.
This part discusses some of these arrangements.
Managers can alter how the corporation is structured and Þnanced
in ways that enable them to retain considerable control over which, if
any, takeovers succeed. Moreover, because shareholders often explicitly
approve the power granted to boards to employ these mechanisms, courts
could not easily invalidate them.60
Boards can retain control over the takeover process through the use
of diﬀerent classes of stock. For example, management can issue two
60

Some of the arrangements we discuss — such as dual class common stock or sweet
heart preferred — arguably are pure defenses. We discuss them here because managers can oﬀer legitimate nondefensive justiÞcations for most corporate Þnancing
arrangements. Moreover, these arrangements are particularly diﬃcult for courts to
regulate because most defenses embedded in capital structure are done with shareholder approval.
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types of common stock, one of which is publicly traded, and the other
of which is in the hands of management (or confederates thereof); this
latter class would be a strong deterrent to a hostile oﬀer to the extent
that consent of a majority of the shares of this class is required for any
corporate combination.61
Alternatively, managers can (and do) obtain shareholder approval for
“blank check preferred” charter provisions. Blank check preferred stock
contains open terms can be speciÞed by the board when it is issued. The
vast majority of publicly held Þrms currently have such charter provisions.62 Boards with this power can issue preferred stock with terms that
deter bids. Although under a strong shareholder choice regime courts
would likely invalidate the use of blank check preferred stock issued postbid, managers subject to such a regime could issue the preferred stock
well before a bid.
Managers can employ preferred stock to retain control over tender
oﬀers by issuing preferred stock that has veto rights over any corporate
combination, and then placing a signiÞcant amount in friendly hands
(“sweet heart preferred”).63 This defense would be particularly eﬀective if Delaware’s anti-takeover statute survives the adoption of shareholder choice.64 Under Delaware § 203, a hostile raider that is unable
to obtain 85% of the shares cannot eﬀect a corporate combination for
three years following its purchase of 15% of the target’s stock without
getting board approval.65 Thus, management can signiÞcantly increase
61

[E.g., Ford’s Class B stock, comprising around 6% of outstanding equity, but
accounting for roughly 40% of voting rights]. Coca Cola and General Motors also
have dual class stock.
In Europe, Þrms have employed dual class stock to deter hostile oﬀers by foreign
bidders by selling special "golden shares" to the government. For example, until
recently UK government has ”golden shares” of at least 26 companies. Local city
governments (e.g., London) and other European governments also have had ”golden
shares” in important Þrms. Paul Hofheinz, EU Seems Set for a Takeover Makeover,
Wall Street Journal, A11 (June 6, 2002). Recently, the European Court of Judgies
issued a series of decisions that restricts companies’ ability to employ golden shares.
Managers retain the ability to adopt a wide variety of protective devices — adopted before a bid is imminent — to thwart takeovers. Johannes Adolﬀ, Turn of the Tide: The
”Golden Share” Judgement and the Liberalization of the European Capital Markets,
3 GLJ No. 8 (August 2002), http: www.germanlawjournal.com/print.php?id=170.
62
In 2000, for example, over 90% of publicly listed Þrms had some form of blank
check preferred stock. Source: Investor Responsibility Research Center database, at
wrds.wharton.upenn.edu.
63
See Edward Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo
L. Rev. 987 (1994).
64
See Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 203 (2003). Even without Delaware 203, management can a similar power to use sweet heart through charter provisions requiring
super-majority consent for any corporate combination. See infra (next para).
65
SpeciÞcally, under Delaware 203 a raider who acquires 15% of the stock cannot do
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the cost of a hostile deal by placing even 10-12% of the voting power in
friendly hands.66 With this much power in friendly hands, managers
can be conÞdent that a hostile raider will be unable to obtain the 85%
necessary to permit a corporate combination following a hostile acquisition.67 For example, in an eﬀort to defend against a hostile bid from
Shamrock, Polaroid sold two special series of preferred stock representing approximately 10% of all votes to Corporate Partners, an investment fund managed by Lazard Freres. Corporate Partners advertised
itself as providing insulation from hostile deals, thereby bonding itself
to management through its desire to preserve this reputation. Management further ensured Corporate Partners’ loyalty by retaining the
right to call the stock and by giving Corporate Partners the right to sell
the stock back to the Þrm for an annual return of 28-30% should Polaroid be acquired by any one other than Shamrock. Faced with voting
stock in management-friendly hands, Shamrock abandoned its hostile
bid. Similarly, Salmon, Gillette, US Air, and Champion International
have each defended against hostile acquisitions by granting signiÞcant
(8-12%) voting power to Warren Buﬀett through the sale of preferred
stock (apparently at a discount).68 While courts might be able to regulate the issuance of post-bid sweet heart preferred, they could not easily
regulate the issuance of sweetheart preferred issued during the course
of ordinary business, as this would entail a determination that certain
shareholders (e.g., Buﬀet) should be prohibited from certain types of
preferred stock.69
a corporate combination within three years of the acquisitions unless (1) the board
of the target approved the deal prior to the raider acquiring 15%; (2) the raider
acquirers 85% of the vote in the transaction that causes it to acquire more than
15% or (3) subsequent to acquiring 15% the raider get the corporate combination
approved by the target’s board and the vote of 66 2/3% of outstanding disinterested
shares.
66
Id. at 1001.
67
Managers can reduce the risk of a toehold proxy contest through the use of a
staggered board.
68
Edward Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo L.
Rev. 987, 991-994 (1994).
69
As in these cases, managers can ensure the loyalty of its ”sweet heart” through
a variety of means: selling to an investor with a well-developed (and proÞtable)
reputation for being friendly to management; inserting contractual provisions that
limit defection; retaining the option to call the investor’s position; or proÞtable side
contracts (e.g., consulting deals) which could be lost in an acquisition. Id at 10041005.
Alternatively, preferred stock can be issued with change of control puts, enabling
(for example) the holder to redeem the stock at a considerable premium upon the
acquisition by any shareholder of some threshold ownership amount, or a change in
control of the board following a proxy contest. Such a redemption premium would
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Even without sweetheart preferred, managers can considerably strengthen
their control over tender oﬀers through charter provisions requiring supermajority consent for any corporate combination. Fair price amendments
requiring, for example, approval of the voting power of 85% of the stock
for any combination can signiÞcantly increase the costs of an acquisition.70 Moreover, such provisions also increase managers’ power to
control the tender oﬀer process to the extent that shareholders are inclined to defer to management’s recommendations. Most importantly,
such provisions can enable managers to block a deal if managers have
a suﬃcient stake that managerial approval is also needed to obtain the
85%.
The discussion above only lists a few of the mechanisms managers
could use to retain considerable control to defeat hostile acquisitions.71
Courts would likely be reluctant to interfere with many of these mechanisms as they generally entail shareholder consent, and shareholders
may have legitimate reasons for granting managers power to adopt these
measures. Nevertheless, while courts should be wary of interfering with
measures shareholders have approved, the fact that these measures garnered ex ante shareholder approval is not suﬃcient to ensure that they
will only be used to when they improve Þrm value. Managers may be able
to get authority to employ such measures even when doing so is welfare
reducing. This is a particular concern because often managers obtain
the requisite approval for such defenses when the Þrm initially goes public. To the extent that the IPO market is not eﬃcient, managers may
obtain authority to adopt such defenses even when they are ineﬃcient.72
drive up the cost of any such acquisition, making hostile acquisitions considerably less
attractive than friendly deals. The deterrent eﬀect of such provisions can be enhanced
to the extent that the Þrm employs standard debt covenants limiting the redemption
of capital stock. Moreover, these provisions would be considerably more diﬃcult for
a court to invalidate than a poison pill, granting rights, as they would, to third parties
who presumably would have paid good value for them. It is likely, however, that
preferred stock with ”hostile only” change of control provisions would be invalidated
by a court pursuing a strong form of shareholder choice. Preferred stock with blanket
change of control puts might be more diﬃcult to invalidate, however. Such blanket
provisions are discussed in the next part.
70
While less common than blank-check preferred super-majority and fair price
provisions are present in between 15 and 20 percent of publicly traded Þrms. See
IRRC, supra note __.
71
BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce have employed the opposite approach to thwart a
hostile tender oﬀer: they limit any single shareholder to owning 15% of the company.
In addition, BAE requires that half the board, the chairman and the chief executive
be British. Paul Hofheinz, EU Seems Set for a Takeover Makeover, Wall St. J. A11
(June 6, 2002).
72
See, e.g, Bebchuk; Klausner [Penn Eds: Can we see the most recent version of
Bebchuk and Klausner’s contributions to this symposium to be sure they still make
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Moreover, even post-IPO, corporate contracting may not be eﬃcient, resulting in shareholder approval of ineﬃcient terms.73 Yet even so, courts
should be wary of attempting to override the results of shareholder voting, as they probably do not possess adequate information to determine
what course of action shareholders should have taken.74
Managers also can retain considerable control through mechanisms
that do not require shareholder approval. Shareholders have no say
over the structure of deals such as spin-oﬀs, or strategic acquisitions
that may make a subsequent tender oﬀer more diﬃcult. For example, a
company can deter bids by placing the Þrm’s most valuable operating
assets (or “crown jewels”) in a spin oﬀ subsidiary governed by a voting
trust. In this case, even if the board of the subsidiary changes, identity
of those in the voting trust does not.75 While many of these measures
would be invalid if adopted post-bid, courts would face great diﬃculty
assessing their validity if adopted in the course of ordinary business. In
addition, managers can discourage hostile bidders by refusing to share
private information (or to do so only grudgingly). Private information
is particularly important for companies with numerous oﬀ balance sheet
arrangements and for companies whose value depends to a considerable
degree on the results of new initiatives (for example, new drugs).
Management also may be able to structure their own contracts to
impose signiÞcant costs on hostile raiders, for example, by incorporating
change of control provisions in their employment contracts that permit
managers to leave immediately upon a change of control with substantive severance packages.76 Augmenting this threat is the fact that managers may be able to make decisions that accentuate their idiosyncratic
value to the Þrm.77
For example, managers may be able to set up
this claim]; cf. Bernard Black & Ron Gilson Banks v. Stock Markets, J. Fin. Econ.
(the existence of defensive charter provisions in IPOs can be explained by the ex
ante deal between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs that gives entrepreneurs a
call option on control).
73
See Lucian Bebchuk, [arguing that shareholders may approve provisions granting
boards control over takeovers that are not eﬃcient]
74
This is particularly the case to the extent that shareholders may conclude that
Þrm value is higher when managers have control over tender oﬀers (both for the
reasons given in this paper and for other reasons). See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra
note [penn article].
75
Cf. Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 1984 WL 8240 (Del Ch. 1984) (Enstar locks
up a deal with Unimar by giving Unimar voting control of its most valuable asset,
Enstar Indonesia, through use of a voting trust even if deal not consumated; court
did not invalidate).
76
At present, many executive severance arrangements give the executive a right to
leave — and collect a hefty severance — some period after the change of control (for
example, six months to one year).
77
Thus, for example, an acquiror considering an acquisition of Donna Karen Inter-
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organizational structures, establish internal lines of communication and
implement corporate cultures that depend critically on centralized managerial skills. By making themselves more valuable to the Þrm, managers
may be able to inßuence which acquisitions succeed by agreeing to work
for some acquirers post-acquisitions and refusing to work for others.78
Management also can reap private beneÞts through their compensation
arrangements with whichever bidder succeeds. Managers’ power to inßuence bids could be particularly strong if they act in concert, threatening
a hostile bidder with a mass exodus (the so-called “Jonestown defense”).
A bidder faced with a mass exodus of management might be reluctant
to proceed with a hostile bid even if it had planned to Þre management
eventually because acquirers often need to use existing management to
train new management. The threat of mass exit, moreover, could significantly inßuence shareholder voting on tender oﬀers particularly if these
clauses deÞne change of control to include a turnover of a majority of the
board within a year. These clauses would raise the costs to shareholders
of accepting a hostile oﬀer because shareholders would know that should
the merger be approved and yet fail to be completed79 they would be left
with a severely weakened Þrm. This would reduce the expected value
to shareholders of any hostile bid, providing management the ability to
discourage hostile bidders and favor friendly ones.80
national would be unlikely to attempt a hostile acquisition given that Donna Karen’s
own emploment contract is terminable upon a change of control.
78
Although it is diﬃcult to garner hard evidence about the degree to which Þrms
engage in such practices, a recent study of employee involvement in Fortune 1000
Þrms is suggestive.See Lawler et al., Organizing for High Performance (Center for
Eﬀective Organizations 2001). From 1987 and 1996, while overall hostile acquisition
activity was ebbing in the wake of Delaware’s anti-takeover statute, Þrms became increasingly likely to involve their employees in quasi-managerial power and information
sharing practices. Such programs include Job Enrichment or Redesign programs,
Self-management teams, Minibusiness unites, and Employee Policy Committees. Id.
[Add descriptive statistics]. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, just as
hostile bid activity began to approach its pre-1987 levels, such employee management
initiatives fell from favor, decreasing in frequency to their pre-statute levels. One
interpretation of this trend (though certainly one of many) is that the credible threat
of hostile acquisitions gives managers an incentive to centralize information management and decision-making authority, in order to make themselves indispensable.
79
The risk of nonconsummation of hostile deals is signiÞcant. We can get a sense
of the magnitude of the risk of noncompletion of hostile deals under a shareholder
choice regime by considering the data on noncompletion of friendly deals where there
is no lock-up or break-up fee. A study of negotiated mergers between 1988-1999
found that 24 percent of these deals were not completed if there was no lock-up
or break-up fee. Even with both a lock-up and break-up fee, 5 percent were not
completed. See John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subgramanian, A Buy-Side Model of
M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 307, 347 (2000).
80
Hostile bidders could, of course, reduce managers’ incentives to employ this de-
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3.3

Blanket Defenses

Outside the context of targeted, pre-bid defenses, managers could alternatively employ pre-bid embedded blanket defenses. These arrangements deter costs on all acquisitions, friendly and otherwise, usually by
imposing substantial costs on the Þrm in the event of a change of control.
While currently managers rarely make aggressive use of blanket defenses
because they want to preserve the possibility of a friendly deal, managers
could use blanket defenses much more aggressively than they do now if
precluded from using more targeted defenses. Indeed, in the next section
we will show that regulation of targeted defenses could induce managers
to adopt blanket defenses that they otherwise would eschew.
3.3.1

Change of Control Provisions in Third Party Agreements

Managers can use the Þrm’s contractual arrangements with third parties to deter bids by including change of control provisions in generic
commercial arrangements. Blanket change of control provisions either
terminate the contract or impose costs on the target in the event of
a change of control or corporate combination,81 either friendly or otherwise.82 The simplest terminate the contract on a change of control.
Others eﬀectively impose a penalty on the Þrm (for the beneÞt of the
fense by oﬀering appropriate incentives for managers to remain. Yet this does not
eliminate the problem created by the threat of managerial exodus. First, in those
circumstances where shareholders are choosing between a hostile bid and a friendly
one, the hostile bidder would in eﬀect have to oﬀer management the equivalent of
the value of their jobs under the friendly deal in order to induce them to abandon
the Jonestown defense. Second, even where there is no other bidder, the amount
management is able to extract from a hostile raider will reduce hostile bidders incentives to bid — and will enable managers to appropriate as private beneÞts some of
the gains from the deal.
81
Change of control provisions vary as to how they deÞne the triggering event.
Managers can draft them to ensure they cover any transaction a hostile raider might
wish to accomplish.
82
In this part, we focus on blanket change of control provisions. Nevertheless, many
Þrms have employed change of control provisions targeted at only hostile takeovers,
primarily in their debt convenants. Indeed, analysis of bond covenants employed
in the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals that many often were designed both to
protect bondholders and to entrench managers. Indeed, almost all the bonds issues
prior to the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout contained covenants which encumbered
only hostile takeovers and proxy contests, usually without regard to their eﬀect on
bond values. After the RJR Nabisco deal, covenants continued to protect management, while providing more protection for bondholders. Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management
Entrenchment: 40 UCLA L. Rev. 931 (1993). We focus on blanket change of control
provisions as these would be the most diﬃcult for courts to regulate, as these clearly
serve legitimate third party interests.
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third party) in the event it experiences a change of control. These contracts would be particularly diﬃcult for courts to regulate because they
generally are adopted well in advance of a tender oﬀer, and they serve
the legitimate goal of protecting third party interests (in addition to
possibly entrenching management).83
Change of control provisions can be — and currently are — incorporated into a variety of contracts, including intellectual property licenses,
leases, joint ventures, union contracts, Employee Stock Option Plans,
debt Þnancing and equity Þnancing.84 These provisions generally either
terminate the contract or impose a penalty on the target in the event of
a change of control.
Change of control provisions are diﬃcult to regulate because they
serve important, legitimate, non-defensive purpose of protecting third
party interests. Third parties contracting with Þrms often have good
reasons for insisting on change of control provisions. Many contracts are
long-term and thus necessarily incomplete. In such cases, the value of
the contract depends critically on the trustworthiness and reliability of
the contracting party. A party to such a contract may seek to protect
itself through a change of control provision that lets it terminate the
contract should the other party’s management change; the other side
thus may grant such a provision to lower the costs to it of the contract.
Alternatively, a party granting a license might seek to protect its own
market position by seeking to control the identity of those who use its
license. For example, it could want to ensure that a competitor did not
obtain the license.
At present, managers generally attempt to avoid incorporating strong
blanket change of control provisions into corporate contracts. As managers beneÞt from friendly deals, they eschew strong blanket provisions
that could deter friendly deals. They employ such measures only when
the third party insists, and the price of not doing so exceeds the expected
cost of the provision. Managers who accept such terms often limit the
eﬀect of such provisions through narrowing the deÞnition of "change of
83

The latter makes them more diﬃcult to invalidate than say lock-ups, whose
primary purpose is to favor one bidder over another. To the extent one accepts
shareholder primacy post-bid, shareholders should determine which bidder to favor.
Shareholders cannot assess the merits of change of control provisions in pre-bid contracts, however — at least not if the presumptions underlying Dela 141(a) and the
Business Judgment Rule are correct.
84
See supra note [discussing change of control puts in preferred stock]. Although
there is not, to our knowledge, a reliable database detailing all variations on change
of control provisions, in 2000 nearly two thirds of all publicly traded Þrms had some
sort of provision in their employment contracts or collective bargaining agreements.
See IRRC database, supra note _.
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control," or attempting to ensure that the impact of such a change is
not too onerous.
Managers could be expected to adopt a very diﬀerent approach to
blanket change of control provisions if precluded by a shareholder choice
regime from using pure defenses, post-bid embedded defenses and targeted pre-bid embedded defenses. In this case, blanket defenses may
become an attractive last resort. Should managers reach this conclusion,
a review of existing change of control provisions suggests that managers
could indeed eﬀectively use these provisions to deter takeovers. They
could employ them in a variety of contracts and could increase their
strength. As third parties currently seek such protections, third parties
would happily accept these expanded protections — and even agree to
insist on them.
Termination Clauses The simplest change of control provisions give
the third party the right to terminate the contract upon a change of
control. For example, many intellectual property licenses, joint venture
agreements and leases have change of control provisions that terminate
the license on change of control.85 Other change of control provisions
impose a penalty on the target in the event of a change of control.
Termination clauses are a particularly eﬀective deterrent in those
circumstances where the target can rely on the third party not to assign
the contract to the acquirer at the original price.86 The risk of nonassigment is signiÞcant in at least three situations. The Þrst is where
the value of the license is substantially higher now than it was when
originally issued. This is particularly likely when long-term license was
issued at an early stage in the product development — for example of a
drug — before the true value was known. In this case, the licensor may
well view the change of control as an opportunity to appropriate the
rents associated with the successful development of the product which
otherwise would have gone to the licensor. In this situation, the change
of control provision may ensure that the Þrm is more valuable unacquired
than acquired.
Second, a termination clause may operate as an eﬀective deterrent
where the contract is material and the licensor is unlikely to assign
the license because it competes with the other potential acquirers.87
85

Indeed, even without a change of control provision, many licenses are presumed
to terminate in the event of a merger where the acquiror is the surviving Þrm. Elaine
Ziﬀ, The Eﬀect of Corporate Acquisitions on the Target Company’s License Rights,
57 Bus. Lawyer 767 (2002).
86
By contrast, termination clauses are not a signiÞcant deterrent to a takeover if
the third party would willingly assign the contract to the acquiror.
87
Similarly, companies can use joint ventures with other Þrms in the same industry
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Indeed, examples currently exist where such provisions have impacted
takeovers.88 For example, eﬀorts to acquire Hershey were hindered in
part by a change of control provision in Hershey’s license from Nestles
S.A. granting it the right to manufacture and sell Kit Kat — one of the
most popular chocolate bars in the world. Nestles has not looked favorably on attempts to acquire Hersheys that might improve Hershey’s competitive position, and has threatened to terminate the license in the event
Hersheys experiences a change of control.89 Moreover, it appears that
some foreign Þrms have employed such provisions for defensive aims. Labatt Ltd., Canada’s second largest beer manufacturer, apparently fended
oﬀ a hostile oﬀer by Onex in part through the use of partially-disclosed
third party contracts and licenses terminable upon a change of control
for Labatt. These third party agreements included the Canadian Budweiser license and the license for the Mexican brewer, Femsa Cerveza
SA.90
Finally, founding shareholders or managers of certain Þrms can use
their own licensing agreements with the Þrm to ensure their continued
ability to determine to whom the Þrm is sold, even if the founding shareto impose similar impediments to acquisitions. Parties to a joint venture also can
to deter bids by including noncompete agreements in the joint venture, that prohibit either the company or an aﬃliate from competing without termination of that
company’s rights under the venture. This would deter acquisition of the Þrm by
companies in the same industry as the venture.
88
Change of control termination clauses do not always deter acquisitions. For example, British American Tobacco Group (BAT) acquired Rothman’s International
notwithstanding the risk that this deal would trigger the change-of-control termination clause in Rothman’s license with Phillip Morris, granting Rothmans the right to
market Marlboro cigarettes and other Phillip Morris brands in the United Kingdom.
It is unclear whether BAT would have purchased the subsidiary if it had been sure
the deal would trigger the clause. BAT and Rothmans tried to structure the deal to
avoid triggering the clause. Phillip Morris claimed the deal did trigger the clause,
in large part because Phillip Morris and BAT are world-wide competitors, being the
largest and second largest companies in the world. See Phillip Morris v. Rothmans
International Enterprises, Ltd„ Chancery Division, (July 19, 2000). Phillip Morris prevailed in the British courts and dissolved the joint venture with Rothmans.
Phillip Morris later awarded the license to another company. Rosie Murray-West,
City-Imperial Land Marlboro Delivery Deal, The Daily Telegraph (Aug. 15, 2001).
89
Gordon Fairclough and Erin White, Shake-Up in Candylad. Sale of Chiclets,
Dentyne, and Nestle’s Hold on KitKat Make Hershey Bidding Sticky, Wall Street
Journal, July 26, 2002.
The Nestle’s deal has not been the only impediment to the sale of Hersheys. The
sale also has been impeded by the political objectives of Hershey Trust Company,
the major Hersheys shareholders. See Robert Frank & Sarah Ellison, Meltdown in
Chocolatetown, Wall Street Journal B1 (Sept. 19, 2002).
90
Larry Greenberg, Onex Pressures Labatt to Disclose Third-Party Pacts, Wall
Street Journal, May 25, 1995.
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holder no longer owns a majority of the shares. For example, rather than
grant valuable intellectual property to the Þrm outright, the founding
shareholder can license the property to the Þrm, with a contract that
provides for termination of the license upon change of control. An example of a Þrm that has employed this type of defensive measure is
Donna Karen. When Donna Karan International went public in 1996,
Ms. Karan and her husband retained control of the trademarks for
most of the product lines — including "Donna Karan," "Donna Karan
New York," "DKNY" and "DK" — under a wholly owned corporation,
Gabrielle Studies. Gabrielle then licensed the trademarks to Donna
Karan Corporation, but subject to a provision terminating the license in
the event of a change of control of Donna Karan Corp.91 The employee
contract with Donna Karan herself also terminates upon change of control. Thus, a hostile acquirer could by the physical assets of the Þrm, but
much of the Þrm’s goodwill evaporates upon a change of control, absent
Ms. Karan’s explicit consent.92 Similarly, FAO Schwartz licenses the
right to the use the name FAO Schwartz from the Schwartz brothers
through a contract that terminates the license should the brothers be
removed from management.93
Penalty Provisions While termination clauses operate as eﬀective
deterrents only in particular circumstances, managers need not restrict
themselves to change of control provisions with termination clauses. Instead, managers can employ change of control provisions that impose
grant the third party the ability of obtain substantial Þnancial beneÞts
from the target in the event of a change of control — in eﬀect imposing
a change of control “penalty” on the target. These penalties, if large
enough, can operate to deter acquisitions. Moreover, they are much
more resistant to renegotiation, since the acquirer must be willing to
compensate the rights holder for the lost chance of receiving the penalty.
An examination of existing “penalty” change of control provisions
reveals their potential defensive power, should managers ever need to
exploit them more aggressively for this purpose.94 For example, noninvestment grade debt often contain a change of control put that gives
91

In this case, a change of control was deÞned as the purchase by a third party of
30% of the stock of Donna Karan Corporation.
92
Wendy Bounds, Donna Karan International Finds Its Slip Is Showing, Wall Street
Journal, May 8, 1997; see Donna Karan International Prospectus, SEC 333-3600 p.
70, 76.
93
[get cite; To eds: we just learned about this and need to get the cite and the
exact language].
94
Indeed, the poison pill is one form of penalty change of control provision. Other
contracts could incorporate penalty provisions of a similar magnitude should courts
preclude managers from using the pill.
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the creditor the right to put their bonds back to the issuer at a premium
upon a change of control. Firms could employ these, and other similar
provisions, to substantially increase the costs of acquisitions.95
Moreover, Þrms can, and do, incorporate penalty change of control
provisions into other contracts, including leases, licenses, union agreements and joint ventures. Joint venture agreement change of control
provisions often grant to one party the right to buy the other’s interest in the venture for less than its fair market value upon a change of
control by the latter.96 Thus, change of control can result in a loss
to the target of the value of the joint venture. If the penalty is large
enough, these provisions can deter an acquiror. Even where it does
not deter the acquisition, they can reduce the value of the deal for the
target’s shareholders. For example, in the shadow of speculation that
Schering-Plough was ripe for a hostile bid, Schering-Plough entered into
a joint venture with Merck & co. to cooperate in the developing and
marketing of a new anti-cholesterol drug, Zetia — a drug many concluded was Schering-Plough’s best hope for future proÞts. This agreement provides that if a third company buys Schering-Plough, Merck can
purchase Schering-Plough’s interest in the joint venture, at a price unlikely to reßect its actual value.97 Given that Zetia is Schering-Plough’s
best hope for a proÞtable future, this joint venture agreement eﬀectively
discourages bids. Similarly, the joint ventures between Wackenhut and
SERCO grants the latter the right to buy out Wackenhut’s interest in
a joint venture between them for less than its fair market value in the
event of a change of control of Wackenhut. Penalty joint venture clauses
also impacted Guinnesses merger with GrandMet. LVMH claimed that
the merger triggered change of control clauses in its joint ventures with
Guinness. These change of control provisions allowed LVMH to buy back
Guiness’ stake in their 17 joint ventures at asset value if Guiness experiences a change of control; they also entitled LVMH to buy Guiness’s
95
Analysis of bond covenants employed in the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals
that many often were designed both to protect bondholders and to entrench managers. Indeed, almost all the bonds issues prior to the RJR Nabisco leveraged
buyout contained covenants which encumbered only hostile takeovers and proxy contests, usually without regard to their eﬀect on bond values. After the RJR Nabisco
deal, covenants continued to protect management, while providing more protection
for bondholders.
96
Examples of joint ventures that have (or had) such clauses include the joint ventures between Guinness and LVMH; General Mills and Nestles to market Haagen-Daz
in the US; Heineken and Quisa to brew and distribute Heineken beer in Argentina;
Texaco and Shell to market reÞne and market gas in the U.S.; PacDun and Goodyear;
and Phillip Morris and British American Tobacco to market tobacco in Great Britain.
97
Peter Landers, Merck SacriÞced Right to Make Buyout Oﬀer to Schering-Plough,
Wall Street Journal B3 (October 22, 2002).
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34 percent stake in Moet Hennessy at a discount of up to 15 percent.98
In return for a payment from Guinness of 250 million, LVMH eventually
agreed to withdraw its eﬀort to block the merger. Had LVMH pursued its
claim in arbitration, the Þrm stood to gain as much as 1 billion pounds
had it prevailed.99
Boards could make greater use of all such penalty change of control provisions were courts to adopt shareholder choice. If the board
adopted blanket provisions that apply to friendly and hostile deals alike,
this could have the eﬀect of reducing the number of acquisitions.100
98

Alasdair Murray, LVMH Move Threatens Points 23bn Guiness Merger, Times of
London (May 29, 1997).
99
Major Obstacle Cleared in (pounds) 24 bn Guinness Deal, The Irish Times (Oct.
14, 1997).
100
Moreover, managers need not necessarily employ only blanket change of control
provisions. Change of control provisions can be easily drafted to provide that the
change of control penalty is imposed only in the event of a hostile change of control:
for example an acquisition not preceded by board consent or a change in the majority
of the board in a single year. Such a provision would, in eﬀect, replicate the eﬀects
of the poison pill. Indeed, such hostile-trigger change of control provisions were
prevalent in debt contracts in the 1980s. Many debt covenants in the 1980s included
change of control provisions that provided that the change of control provision was
triggered only by a hostile deal: deÞned as either the acquisition of a large block
of a corporation’s shares or the replacement of a majority of the board through a
proxy challenge.See Kahan & Klausner, supra note , at 947, 970. While management subsequently reduced their use in the late 1980s, one would expect adoption of
shareholder choice to cause managers to reconsider the need for hostile-trigger debt
covenants that impose penalties on the Þrm in the event of a change of control.
Moreover, under a shareholder choice regime such provisions could eﬀectively grant
the board greater power to deter hostile bids than would the poison pill. Courts can
regulate the board’s use of a redeemable poison pill by requiring boards to submit
all bids to the shareholders for a vote. The pill would not alter the outcome of
that vote. The same cannot be said for hostile-trigger change of control provisions,
however. Hostile-trigger change of control provisions enable managers to impose
costs on the target Þrm in the event of a change of control even if shareholders
approve the deal. Classic hostile-trigger change of control provisions are drafted so
that the provision is triggered if there is either a change in the composition of the
board or an acquisition without board approval. Under such terms, the board can
guarantee that the provision is triggered simply by resisting the deal, even if the
board does not interfere with shareholders’ ability to replace them through a proxy
contest. Such a provision would thus increase the costs of the deal. Moreover, it
signiÞcantly increases the costs to shareholders of supporting a proxy contest. Even
the best deals have associated with them a risk of noncompletion. Hostile-trigger
covenants decrease the expected gains to shareholders of a hostile acquisition by
raising the costs to shareholders of deal non-completion. Hostile-trigger change of
control provisions are a particularly powerful deterrent to hostile deals because they
are triggered by the outcome of the proxy contest, not the completion of the deal.
Thus, if the board resists a hostile deal as not in the Þrm’s best interests — thereby
requiring a proxy contest in order to get the deal approved — shareholders evaluating
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Moreover, managers could employ stronger provisions than those used
at present, justifying it by a greater need to protect third parties. They
also include increase their deterrent eﬀect by inserting such provisions
into many separate types of contracts. Change of control provisions in
a variety of Þrm contracts would be particularly troublesome for a bidder, as the bidder might know some such provisions exist but the precise
terms would not necessarily be subject to disclosure requirements – a
danger that dramatically increases the uncertainty and cost accompanying a hostile bid.101
Limits of Court Capacity to Regulate Courts could not conÞdently prohibit the use of change of control provisions without imposing signiÞcant costs on the Þrm. Courts cannot simply invalidate these
clauses because they often increase Þrm value by protecting legitimate interests on contracting parties, thereby lowering the Þrms’ costs of entering into various arrangements.102 Indeed, courts should be particularly
wary of prohibiting such penalty change of control provisions because
— even in the current legal environment — numerous existing contracts
employ penalty change of control provisions. The use of such provisions,
notwithstanding management’s access to low cost defenses such as the
poison pill and classiÞed board, lends credence to the claim that these
provisions serve legitimate goals: why would management use these more
the deal must recognize that voting for the insurgents will immediately trigger the
change of control penalty, which must be paid whether or not the acquirer is able to
complete the acquisition. This raises the potential cost to shareholders of supporting
a proxy contest, as the cost is borne with certainty yet the beneÞts are not certain.
The use of these hostile-trigger covenants would present courts with a diﬃcult
choice. Permitting managers to employ them would, in eﬀect, render a shareholder
choice regime ineﬀective. Yet invalidating such contracts would require the courts to
interfere with contracts between the company and third parties, contracts with rights
that the third parties paid for. Moreover, the Þrm would not necessarily be better
oﬀ if the court precluded such targeted, hostile-only provisions as managers might
instead employ blanket change of control provisions. If so, the implementation of
shareholder choice could signiÞcantly reduce Þrm value.
101
The board need not disclose the terms of nonmaterial contracts. Managers thus
can create a secret impediment to hostile bidders by including change of control
provisions in each of their third party contracts — where each individual contract is
not material in and of itself, even though the collective eﬀect of all these contracts
might be quite material indeed. Managers could deter bids by both imposing costs
and increasing potential acquirors’ uncertainty by letting it be known that such terms
exist while not disclosuing their terms.
102
See text accompanying notes _ -__ supra. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management
Entrenchment? 40 UCLA Law Rev. 931 (1993) (discussing how change of control
provisions in bonds can beneÞt shareholders).
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expensive measures when the lower cost poison pill is available?103 Nor
can courts reliably separate legitimate from illegitimate (defensive) termination clauses because courts are not well positioned to measure the
relative ex ante beneÞt and cost to the company of granting the third
party such protection. Courts also could not separate legitimate from illegitimate change of control provisions by requiring shareholder consent
to such contracts. These contracts are adopted as part of everyday business operations — outside the glare and heightened scrutiny associated
with tender oﬀers. Assuming that the basic premise of the separation
of ownership and control is correct, shareholders are not suﬃciently informed to oversee reliably the terms of these contracts. Thus, under
shareholder choice courts would have to accept the defensive use of such
clauses or risk excessive regulate of legitimate business transactions.104
3.3.2

Managerial Relationships

Boards subject to shareholder choice also might attempt to both deter
bids and increase their own private beneÞts from a bid by through the
design of change of control provisions in executive compensation agreements (Golden Parachutes).
Typical executive compensation arrangements provide that on a change
of control senior management gets severance pay equal to 3 years salary,
bonuses and options.105 In additions, the change of control often vests
the executives stock options. These severance payments — particularly
when coupled with executive stock options and Employee Stock Option
Plans that accelerate vesting upon change of control — can signiÞcantly
raise the cost of a tender oﬀer. Taken together, these provisions enti103

For a possible explanation of why board’s might not employ optimal takeover
defenses see John Coates IV, Lawyers....
104
See note _ supra [note on proxies]. Change of control provisions not only are
diﬃcult for courts to regulate, but are particularly bad candidates for regulation
through the shareholder proxy process. Shareholders may be unwilling to respond
to such provisions by replacing management for two reasons. First, depending on
how the change of control provisions are written, a successful proxy contest itself
may trigger the change of control provcision. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note
(describing debt covenants with this feature). Second, shareholders have little to
gain from such a proxy contest since, unlike in the case of redeemable poison pills,
shareholders of Þrms with strong change of control provisions may not be able to make
the Þrm more takover friendly by changing management. These change of control
provisions eﬀectively cede control over these arrangements to the third party. Thus,
managements adoption of such provisions will not necessarily provide shareholders
with an incentive to replace management.
105
The cost of these payments may be greater than other executive compensation
if the cash amount exceeds IRS limitations on cash compensation, resulting in the
Þrm being unable to deduct these amounts. See Nomad Acquisition Corp v Damon,
1988 Del. Ch. Lexis 133 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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tle executives to reap considerable private beneÞts from a takeover.106
These provisions also impose an additional cost on the bidder not otherwise borne by the Þrm. This substantial transaction cost of a tender
oﬀer can give managers considerable latitude to pursue private beneÞts
without fear of a hostile oﬀer.
Moreover, while currently executive severance packages are not sufÞciently large to deter deals, there is no reason to assume they would
remain at current levels. Executives sheltered by the pill and the ECB
have had little reason to use these mechanisms primarily as a serious
takeover defense, and have every reason not to discourage friendly deals.
Yet there is little reason to believe the structure of such plans would remain Þxed following implementation of shareholder choice. Executives
facing a greater risk of termination could legitimately insist on larger severance packages. If high enough, these packages could deter acquisitions
at the margin.107 In addition, even if they did not deter acquisitions,
such arrangements would grant to executives ex ante the disproportionate share of the takeover premium that proponents of shareholder choice
seek to wrest from them in favoring shareholder over managerial control
over tender oﬀers.108

3.4

Implications for Shareholder Choice

The preceding discussion demonstrates a wide variety of corporate arrangements that managers could employ to thwart tender oﬀers if managers
are precluded from using pure defenses and post-bid embedded defenses
by shareholder choice. At present, managers employ most of these measures (if at all) primarily for legitimate non-defensive purposes. The
evidence of legitimate use of these measures suggests that they serve
important value enhancing goals, and cannot simply be prohibited. Yet,
examination of these measures reveals their potential to thwart tender
oﬀers — either hostile or friendly.109
Should a mandatory shareholder choice regime induce managers to
106

Employee stock option plans (ESOPs) also are employed to deter bidders. These
plans grant stock options to employees with vesting periods that may be as long as
__ years. ESOPs commonly have change of control provisions which accelerate
the vesting of these stock options. This imposes a signiÞcant additional cost on an
acquiror, who buy out all these additional shares at the bid price.
107
Courts would likely invalidate compensation that is completely unreasonable.
Moreover, courts might be particularly likely to invalidate Golden Parachuttes that
subject the Þrm to tax penalties imposed on excessive severance packages.
108
See infra text accompanying notes _-_ (explaining why shareholder choice may
reduce shareholders’ welfare even if shareholders employ incentive compensation to
deter managers from adopting pre-bid embedded defenses).
109
Moreover, managers seeking to use these measures to thwart tender oﬀers could
easily increase their eﬀectiveness in a variety of ways.
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employ pre-bid embedded measures — particularly blanket embedded
measures — this could reduce Þrm value by reducing the probability of
both hostile and friendly acquisitions. Moreover, courts would not be capable of meeting the threat of manager substitution into these defenses.
While courts might detect the most egregious tactics, courts could not
broadly regulate these measures without the risk of negatively impacting
Þrm value through court interference with the management of the Þrm.
Accordingly, having determined that managers could employ pre-bid
embedded defenses, it remains to be seen whether a managerial threat
to do so would be credible or not. It is to this question that we now
turn.

4

The Incentive to Employ Embedded Defenses

This section evaluates whether a serious risk exists that managers would
indeed employ embedded defenses at the pre-bid stage if subject to a
shareholder choice regime. In order to consider this question, we consider
the strongest version of shareholder choice under which managers cannot
employ either pure defenses or post-bid defenses to retain control over
tender oﬀers.110 Indeed, because managers would have no reason not to
substitute into targeted pre-bid embedded defenses if permitted to do so,
we focus on the more diﬃcult question: if subject to a strong shareholder
choice regime that removed all other defenses except pre-bid embedded
blanket defenses, would managers be willing to adopt these defenses,
even at the obvious cost to themselves of decreasing the probability of a
friendly deal?
Of course, an aﬃrmative answer to this question would not imply
that shareholder choice is value reducing. Many of these pre-bid embedded defenses may themselves be value-enhancing. In other words,
managers entering into such contracts may be taking actions that they
would take anyway, even absent shareholder choice. For example, certain joint ventures may be suﬃciently attractive to a Þrm to justify its
acquiescence to a punitive change of control provision, even they deter
acquisitions. Thus, the critical issue for evaluating managerial responses
to shareholder choice is not to ask whether managers would ever adopt
pre-bid mixed motive defenses (since many would anyway), but rather
whether managers might do so in instances where such defenses are value
reducing (all things considered) from shareholders’ perspective.
We now consider whether shareholder choice might result in man110
We are focusing on the proposal of Lucian Bebchuk who argues in favor of requiring boards to submit all tender oﬀers to shareholders for a vote, and forbidding
boards from implementing any post-bid defensive measures without shareholder approval. See Bebchuk supra note [chicago].
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agers adopting value-reducing pre-bid embedded blanket defenses, assuming they were precluded from adopting any targeted or post-bid defenses. At Þrst it might appear that managers would not adopt such
defenses because, notwithstanding the obvious beneÞt to them of deterring hostile acquisitions, blanket defenses can only be used at the cost
of reducing the likelihood of a friendly deal. Managers might be loathe
to deter friendly deals because management beneÞts from friendly deals,
both because acquirors often grant managers’ private beneÞts and because, to the extent that managers have incentive packages (through
stock compensation, for example), managers beneÞt pro rata qua shareholders from acquisitions. The credibility of a manager’s threat to implement embedded defenses when they are value-reducing thus turns on
whether the manager’s private gain from doing so would justify her private costs. This determination in turn depends on both the nature of
the pre-bid defenses available to management, and how (and whether)
shareholders can respond to the threat by altering the manager’s compensation package.
Consider now whether managers would employ a blanket defense,
if precluded from using targeted defenses.111 The next section of this
article employs a formal model to consider the question of whether managers subject to shareholder choice would resort to embedded blanket
defenses at the pre-bid stage if precluded from employing those targeted
to hostile bids alone. While we leave the formal analysis for the next section, a nontechnical analysis of managers’ incentives under shareholder
choice suggests that there exists a serious threat that, while managers
would have little reason to adopt blanket defenses under managerial
choice, under shareholder choice they could credibly threaten to adopt
111

As previously discussed, management potentially has available to it a host of
pre-bid mixed motive defenses which currently are not regulated by the courts. A
number of these defenses enable managers to impose costs on bidders only in the
event of a hostile acquisition. Should courts implementing shareholder choice still
permit such “hostile-only” defenses, managers would certainly implement them. Indeed, by so doing the manager could protect her private beneÞts from a hostile deal,
while simultaneously preserving her rights under friendly deals. In this instance, a
shareholder choice regime would do little more than replace one type of poison pill
with another — with no resulting increase in shareholder control over tender oﬀers.
Thus, if shareholder choice proposals are to have any eﬀect whatsoever, it would
require that courts could comfortably prohibit all hostile-only defenses, even those
that ostensibly were requested by third parties. As previously discussed, we conclude
that managers may retain the ability to employ targeted defenses (see supra text accompanying notes __—__). This undermines the value of shareholder choice. This
section shows that even if courts can eﬀectively regulate targetted defenses, shareholder choice will not improve shareholder welfare if managers can employ blanket
defenses.
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such blanket defenses, even when doing so reduces Þrm value.
Under a managerial veto rule, management has no reason to adopt a
blanket defense that deters hostile and friendly deals alike. Management
can use targeted defenses to deter hostile deals alone, and has no reason
to deter friendly deals because management a friendly deal can only make
management better oﬀ than otherwise (or else the managers would not
approve the deal). Thus, management subject to managerial choice will
eschew blanket defenses because they would be unwilling to pay the
price, in terms of the decreased expected private beneÞts from a friendly
deal.
By contrast, management would be willing to adopt blanket pre-bid
defenses under shareholder choice (if precluded from employing hostileonly defenses); moreover, managers might well implement such defenses
even if such actions were value reducing for the Þrm. Shareholder choice
dramatically increases the beneÞts of such defenses and reduces their
costs. Under an eﬀective shareholder choice regime that precludes all
targeted, pure, and post-bid defenses, acquirers would compete with
each other to win shareholder’s favor, not that of the board. This means
that acquirers would eﬀectively structure deals as hostile deals, in that
they would pay all the gains to shareholders. Managers thus would
view all prospective acquisitions as hostile acquisitions, in the sense that
managers would not be compensated for their foregone private beneÞts. Thus, managers would view acquisitions as imposing a cost — in
terms of decreased private beneÞts — with little upside, except to the extent managers themselves own shares. Therefore, managers would fear
acquisitions more than under shareholder choice, because acquisitions
generally would be hostile. And they would have less to lose from deterring ostensibly friendly deals, because managers would no longer reap
substantial private beneÞts from these deals. Therefore, managers would
have considerably more to gain — and much less to lose — from adopting
blanket defenses than they would under managerial choice. More important, because such defenses would increase manager’s ability to retain
private beneÞts, managers would be willing to adopt pre-bid blanket
defenses to deter acquisitions even when doing so is value reducing. In
this case, shareholder choice could reduce Þrm value below that available
under managerial choice.
Nor can shareholders avoid the "substitution eﬀect" costs of shareholder choice by employing incentive compensation to deter managers
from adopting blanket defenses. In the next section, we show that shareholders can grant managers a suﬃcient stake in the Þrm to deter them
from adopting blanket defenses. To do so, however, shareholders may
need to grant managers such a large stake in the Þrm that shareholders
42

gain less from the Þrm than they would under managerial veto.112
Accordingly, shareholder choice does not necessarily increase shareholder welfare. While shareholder choice would increase the probability
that any tender oﬀer that is made succeeds, it may reduce shareholder
welfare by reducing either (1) reduce the total number of acquisitions or
(2) the amount that acquirers would be willing to pay even in successful acquisitions, or both. Alternatively, the fear of these repercussions
might induce shareholders to gross up the incentive pay of the manager
to deter her from selecting the embedded defense. But even here, it may
be necessary to increase the manager’s pay so much that shareholders
are made worse oﬀ. In any event, the bottom line eﬀect of a shareholder
choice regime would be, ironically, to reduce shareholder value.
Thus, shareholders’ apparent disinterest in campaigning aggressively
for shareholder choice may not be a product of collective action problems,
lack of information, or failures of the IPO markets. Rather, shareholders
may fail to insist on shareholder choice because they recognize that it is
not actually available to them — not at least, under a regime of professional managerial control of day-to-day business decisions. Shareholders
could block certain defenses, but not all defenses. As the defenses shareholders can block are, in the end, less destructive of Þrm value than
other blanket defenses managers might employ, shareholders may live
with these defenses (and ”Just Say No”) for fear the alternative would
be worse.
112

See infra text accompanying notes _-_ (demonstrating the conditions where this
obtains).
Shareholders also have other means to regulate managers, for example the proxy
contest. In theory, even under a strong shareholder choice regime, the threat of a
proxy contest among existing shareholders may deter managers from systematically
pursuing value-reducing projects for self preservation purposes. Yet shareholders
also have the ability to deter managers from employing post-bid defenses with the
threat of a proxy contest should they chose to do so. This threat has not detered
managers from using pure or post-bid defenses at shareholders’ expense. Moreover,
shareholders would be particularly unlikely to use the proxy contest to deter pre-bid
embedded defenses because the most salient diﬃculty with pre-bid embedded blanket
defenses is that shareholders are not suﬃciently informed or motivated to assess the
overall costs and beneÞts that stem from such a defense. Consequently, shareholders
would not know whether to challenge any given blanket measure. It is diﬃcult to
understand how this same shareholder might become enlightened when the decision
at issue moved from challenging a transaction to removing a director. Indeed, it is
this same diﬃculty that underlies the numerous prohibitions provisions in state and
federal law that prohibit shareholders from using the proxy system to alter ordinary
business decisions. See DGCL § 141(A); Securities Rule 14a-8 (cite subrules).
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5

Formal Analysis

In this section, we turn to a more formal demonstration of our claim that
the imposition of shareholder choice may give managers an enhanced incentive to adopt pre-bid blanket embedded defenses, even if such actions
reduce Þrm value. As noted above, such defenses may impose greater
costs on the Þrm than existing targeted defenses, such as the poison
pill, since they deter both hostile and friendly deals alike. As we demonstrate below, the unabated ability to “just say no” at a tender oﬀer stage
can certainly deter some tender oﬀers (as shareholder choice advocates
claim). But at the same time, a managerial choice regime does not give
managers a perverse incentive to pursue value-reducing projects solely in
the interests of preserving their positions. In such situations, the move
to a shareholder choice regime can be value reducing.
In order to focus our inquiry, we will employ a stylized, theoretical
model of Þrm management in a takeover setting. As with any model,
our analysis will present a simpliÞed portrait of the world, but one that
reßects a minimal set of characteristics that we believe to be critical to
the institutional context of takeover defenses. In particular, we want to
capture the following details of the acquisitions market that – given our
discussion above – appear to be the most salient:
• First, managers of corporations should be able to derive private
beneÞts from control, which in turn give them a strong incentive
to either preserve their positions (in the case of a hostile bid) or
demand compensation from an acquirer (in the case of a friendly
bid);
• Second, our model should allow for there to be an active market
for corporate control, so that some component of Þrm value comes
from the prospect of a future takeover (hostile or friendly);
• Third, we should operate under the provisional assumption that
shareholders are suﬃciently sophisticated and coordinated to make
payoﬀ maximizing decisions about whether to sell their shares to a
bidder (indeed, if they were not, it would constitute an independent
argument against shareholder choice);
• Fourth, managers should matter — that is, they should be in a
position to aﬀect dramatically the investment choices and activities
that a Þrm conducts long before any takeover attempt is imminent,
and that these decisions can aﬀect the costs of an acquisition;
• And Þnally, our model should presume that neither shareholders
nor courts are suﬃciently informed to determine which pre-bid em44

bedded defenses are value increasing and which are not (otherwise
there would be little justiÞcation for either professional management or the Business Judgement Rule).

5.1

Framework

Consider a business enterprise (or “Þrm”) that exists for two periods and
is (at least initially) owned by a homogenous group of shareholders. We
assume that all of the Þrm’s share holdings are initially vested in either
a single entity, or if dispersed, that shareholders suﬀer from no collective
action problems that would disable them from acting in a coordinated
fashion, and thus can be treated as a homogenous entity.113 The ex
post value of the Þrm has a random component, and is realized only at
the end of the second period. Explicitly, the value of the Þrm could be
either “high” (and equal to VH ) or “low” (and equal to VL < VH ), with
probabilities and values speciÞed below.
The shareholders of the Þrm are unable to manage the Þrm themselves, and they therefore hire a liquidity constrained, risk neutral manager (denoted by M) to manage the Þrm. The manager has a speciÞc
quality characteristic, denoted as q ∈ [0, 1], which we equate with the
probability that the Þrm has a high value rather than a low value. Thus,
the Þrm’s expected gross payoﬀ is qVH + (1 − q) VL . This quality characteristic is assumed to be uniformly distributed and not known initially,
but it is realized and observed by both the shareholders and manager
just prior to a bid being made114 .
In managing the Þrm, the manager is in a position to make an important investment decision on behalf of the company. In particular, she
must decide between pursuing one of two projects. Project 1 represents
the “status quo” — that is, an activity that does not materially change
the existing proÞle of the company. If the Þrm pursues this project, we
normalize the Þrm’s ex post value to be either VH = 1 or VL = 0. Project
2, in contrast, represents a blanket embedded defense that aﬀects both
Þrm value and also the probability/terms of a tender oﬀer. As to the for113

This assumption enables us to examine shareholder choice the light most favorable to its success. If shareholders were subject to large collective action problems,
it would constitute an independend argument in favor of managerial control.
114
It is possible to alter this assumption and suppose that shareholders never learn
the manager’s quality. But once again, such an assumption would stack the deck
against a shareholder choice regime, as the manager would have strictly better information about the merits of an outside tender oﬀer.
In addition, it would be possible to alter the model to allow the manager to know
her quiality ex ante, and have the shareholders learn it later. In the interests of
simpliÞcation (and to avoid analysis of a number of signalling considerations that are
not germane to our inquiry), we have opted for a simpler framework.
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mer, we assume that Project 2 can potentially be either value increasing
or decreasing. SpeciÞcally, under the second project, the Þrm’s ex post
values are either VH = ∆ or VL = 0. We allow ∆ to be any non-negative
value, and in particular, ∆ could be greater than or less than 1. The expected value of the project under current management is therefore equal
to q for P1 and ∆q for P2. Thus, so long as the Þrm remains under
current management, it is value maximizing for M to choose P2 if ∆ ≥ 1
but not if ∆ < 1.115
Beyond the diﬀerence in payoﬀ, however, P2 diﬀers from P1 another
important respect: what happens in the event of a takeover. In particular, under the status quo Project 1, we shall presume that an acquirer
who purchases controlling interest in the Þrm116 can appropriate the entire post-acquisition value of the Þrm. By contrast, under Project 2, the
acquirer (friendly or hostile) is only able to appropriate some fraction
c < 1 of Þrm value upon the successful acquisition. In other words, the
(1 − c) fraction of the Þrm value that the acquirer cannot appropriate
represents an extra cost of the acquisition.
In practical terms, P2 could represent any of a variety of actions that
managers can take to drive a wedge between their own costs of managing the Þrm and those of an outsider. These include the various blanket
embedded defenses discussed in the previous sections, including preferred stock with change-of-control penalty puts, third party contracts
with change of control provisions, managerial contracts with severance
clauses, idiosyncratic organizational structures, and the like. As noted
above, some of these actions might be perfectly justiÞable from an organizational perspective (in that they have a suﬃciently large ∆ that the
associated beneÞts exceed the costs); others, however, have little value
and impose net costs on the Þrm. As such, we shall assume that, in the
ex ante period where project selection occurs, neither shareholders nor
courts can eﬀectively regulate the manager’s project choice (or otherwise
regulate the choice of P2).117
In addition to making the organizational choices noted above, M is
assumed to be in a position to divert a fraction of Þrm value, denoted by
β, for her personal gain. This diversion
is
¡
¢ wasteful, however, in that the
1 2
manager actually receives only β − 2 β , which is less than the amount
115
Interestingly, as will become clear below, it might also be ineﬃcient to choose
P2 even when ∆ > 1, since the adoption of project 2 would also deter some future
takeovers.
116
In what follows, we shall equate controlling interest with outright ownership of
the Þrm. This is done solely for the sake of simplifying the analysis.
117
In technical terms, then, we assume that project choice is not contractable. (We
shall elaborate more on B’s available strategies and constraints later).
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of value diverted.118 Consequently, non-managerial shareholders (and
society) will possibly be interested in giving the manager some incentives
to prevents such value diversion. Indeed, without such incentives, M will
choose to divert the entire value of the Þrm.119
In what follows, we shall analyze the features of a contract with
the manager containing two possible terms. The Þrst component of
the contract is a simple salary, denoted by w. The second term is an
incentive component of the contract: a fractional ownership share of
the company, denoted by σ, representing restricted stock, stock options,
and so forth. Clearly, once this incentive compensation is paid, the nonmanagerial shareholders retain only a (1 − σ) ownership share of the
Þrm’s net value.
To simplify things, we normalize the best payoﬀ that the manager
could get working outside the company to be zero, and assume that the
manager has no existing wealth. This means that the values of w and σ
can never be negative (which accords with reality).
Finally, in order to compare the takeover eﬀects of a shareholder
choice regime against a managerial choice regime, it will also be necessary to introduce a market for corporate control. Consequently, in later
subsections we shall also allow a third party, denoted by B, to make
a bid for the entire corporation. Depending on the underlying legal
regime, B’s bid must be acceptable to both managers and shareholders
(under a managerial choice regime), or only to shareholders (under a
shareholder choice regime). We shall elaborate more on B’s preferences
and strategies below. Summarizing, then, the sequence of the game is
as follows:
118

This assumption captures the idea that private beneÞts may be more than just a
transfer payment — imposing no eﬃciency losses — but may indeed be value reducing.
This expression can be generalized in many ways without loss of generality. For
example, Bebchuk (2002)
³ uses a´similar expression, where the manager’s private
1 2
β . The parameter γ captures the eﬃciency with
beneÞts are given by β − 2γ
which M can siphon oﬀ value; when γ is relatively large, M is an eﬃcient appropriator
of value; conversely when γ is relatively small, M does not especially beneÞt from
appropriating value (either because she is not terribly good at it, or because she feels
remorse at doing so, and so forth).³ Nevertheless,
note that marginal beneÞt to the
´
β
manager of value appropriation is 1 − γ < 1. M is presumed to set β after project
type selected and any control transactions are decided, but before Þnal realization
of the project value. We have chosen a simpler form to focus on other conceptual
details.
119
To see this, note that the marginal value of taking private beneÞts is equal to
(1 − β) . This is positive for all β < 1, and thus without any countervailing incentive,
M will appropriate the whole value of the Þrm.
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Figure 1: Sequence of Decisions

5.2

No Market for Corporate Control

As a baseline for later comparison, it is useful to begin by considering a
special case in which no takeover market exists. Note that in the absence
of a takeover market, P1 and P2 diﬀer only through there eﬀect on VH ,
since no acquirer will ever have to confront the additional costs imposed
by P2. (As such, P1 can be thought of as a special case of P2, in which
∆ = 1; we shall therefore concentrate on the more general case of P2 in
what follows.)
First consider the parties’ respective payoﬀs. Given her quality parameter q and level of beneÞt extraction β, the total value of the Þrm
(or π F (q, β)) consists of the expected value of the project less the Þxed
component of the wage paid to the manager:
π F (q, β) = (1 − β) · ∆q −
{z
}
|
Exp. Val. of Project

w
|{z}

(1)

Fixed Wage

This value will generally correspond to the total capitalized stock value of
the company. Of this value, nonmanagerial shareholders enjoy a (1 − σ)
share, while M receives a σ share. But in addition to her pro rata
ownership share, M receives additional private beneÞts and her ßat wage.
Thus, the expected payoﬀ of M is as follows:
¶
µ
1 2
w
(2)
π M (q, β) = σ · ((1 − β) · ∆q − w) + β − β · ∆q + |{z}
|
{z
}
2
Wage
|
{z
}
Share ownership component
Private Ben. Component
¶
µ
1 2
= σ · (1 − β) + β − β · ∆q + (1 − σ) · w
2
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The manager will therefore set β to maximize her expected payoﬀ,
which yields an optimal level of value diversion of β ∗ = (1 − σ) . Note
that this optimal choice is independent of either the expected value of
the project chosen (∆q) or on the manager’s Þxed wage (w).
Substituting this value into the parties various payoﬀs yields the
following Table. The columns of the Table correspond to the project
chosen by the manager (i.e., P1 or P2). The rows of the Table
correspond to diﬀerent slices of the total payoﬀ created from the
selected project. The Þrst row reßects the manager’s expected payoﬀ
(which includes her private beneÞts, wages, and her pro rata earnings
as a shareholder). The second row reßects the expected payoﬀ of
non-managerial shareholders. The third row reßects the total
capitalized value of the company (that is, the sum of all the parties
share values). And Þnally, the fourth row reßects sum of the managers,
and non-managerial expected payoﬀs.

Manager
Non-M SHs
Firm Value
Social Value

Expected
³ 2 ´ payoﬀ under P1 Expected
³ 2 ´ payoﬀ under P2
1+σ
1+σ
q + (1 − σ) w
∆q + (1 − σ) w
2
2
(1 − σ) σq − (1 − σ) w
σq
³ −w ´
σ+

1−σ2
2

q

(1 − σ) σ · ∆q − (1 − σ) w
σ∆q
−w ´
³
σ+

1−σ 2
2

∆q

(3)

Table 3
In the discussion below,
we will
³
´ frequently use the term µ0 as a
1−σ2
shorthand for the term σ + 2
. Note that µ0 ≥ σ and µ0 ≥ 12 .
The optimal compensation package for M is one that attempts to
maximize the non-managerial shareholder’s payoﬀ subject to participation and incentive constraints of M. Analyzing this problem yields the
following proposition (which is proved in the appendix).
Proposition 1 In the absence of a market for corporate control, the
optimal incentive compatible, individually rational contract is given
by w N = 0 and σ N = 12 . Under this contract, the manager sets
β N = 12 , and chooses the project P1 (P2) if and only if ∆ < 1
(∆ ≥ 1).
A few details bear note about Proposition 1. First, the optimal incentive contract compensates M through share ownership, and selects
the minimum feasible wage level w = 0 needed to induce participation
by M. (This will turn out to be true for the remainder of the discussion,
and thus without any loss of generality, we suppress the analysis of a
49

ßat wage and simply impose the condition w = 0). This result follows
naturally from the assumptions that the shareholder-manager contract
is infected by a moral hazard problem and that M is risk neutral. On the
other hand, the manager has relatively signiÞcant incentive compensation. In particular, the optimal contract pays a manager one half of the
Þrm’s shareholdings in order to incentivize her away from taking private
beneÞts.120
Second, and perhaps most importantly, Proposition 1 reveals that, in
the absence of takeovers, shareholders can perfectly align the managers
incentives with their own. In this case, the manager always chooses
the highest value project from the shareholders’ perspective, and does
not select project P2 when it is ineﬃcient (from the non-managerial
shareholders’ perspective) to do so. Indeed, without any takeover market
to worry about, the manager evaluates project P2 solely based on its
ability to increase Þrm value (over which she has a fractional claim).

5.3

Market for Corporate Control

Consider now M’s incentives when faced with the possibility of a takeover.
As noted above, we assume that after M makes a project choice, a single
bidder (denoted by B) emerges as a potential acquirer. Similar to M,
player B has some ability to run the Þrm, and is thus is assumed to draw
her own quality parameter θ from a U [0, 1] distribution, which is independent of M’s. Thus, the bidder may be better than the incumbent,
but is not so. The buyer must decide on her bid without knowing the
manager’s quality — although she does know the distribution of q. She
bids on control of entire Þrm, then, making conjecture about existing
managerial quality.121
This subsection will analyze and then compare two alternative rules
for regulating takeovers. Under the Þrst, the manager has the right
to veto a tender oﬀer before other shareholders are allowed to vote on
it. This rule eﬀectively requires that a takeover oﬀer be a friendly offer which compensate both the manager and the shareholders for their
reservation values. Such a rule would correspond to permitting man120

Although this level of compensation may seem a bit unrealistic, with added
complexity it is possible to generalize M’s private beneÞt function to get diﬀerent
1 2
β , the optimal
results. For instance, if M’s private beneÞts were equal to β − 2γ
o
n
1
. Thus, for
incentive scheme would pay M a share component of σ = max 0, 1 − 2γ
small values of γ, the manager receives very little incentive compensation because he
is not suﬃciently talented at diverting value.
Second, as we shall see below, the introduction of a market for corporate control
will tend to reduce the optimal share compensation below this level.
121
Note that since M has chosen the project prior to the realization of q, the observed
project choice signals nothing to B about the manager’s quality.
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agers to “Just Say No.” Under the second, shareholders alone have the
right to approve or disapprove a tender oﬀer. This rule, therefore, eﬀectively allows either friendly or hostile bids (though in our framework all
such bids will be hostile). In order to give the shareholder choice rule
a fair hearing, we shall assume that shareholders can make an informed
choice about whether to sell, and thus that the shareholders learn about
the incumbent manager’s quality before voting on a tender oﬀer under
either rule.
5.3.1

Managerial Choice Regime

Consider Þrst the impact of the takeover market on Þrm value — and in
particular on the manager’s choice between P1 and P2 — under a managerial choice regime. Under such a rule, both M and the non-managerial
shareholders must approve a tender oﬀer in order for B to succeed in acquiring the Þrm. Thus, the acquirer must compensate both the manager
and the shareholders to gain their approval. Consequently, then, under
a managerial choice (or alternatively, managerial “veto”) rule, all tender
oﬀers must by deÞnition be friendly ones. In this case B will oﬀer two
prices in making her bid: one for the purchase of all outstanding shares
(denoted as pS ), and the other functioning as an additional “side payment” that goes to incumbent management to purchase their approval
(denoted as pM ).122
For B’s tender oﬀer to be successful, then it must be suﬃciently high
to satisfy both the incumbent shareholders’ and the incumbent manager’s expected payoﬀs under the status quo. In particular, managers
must reap gains from the deal equal to those she would have received
from continuing with the Þrm. Similarly, shareholders must be as well
oﬀ under the acquisition as they would be otherwise. Consequently,
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a successful bid are that:
• The total bid, (pS + pM ) , must be equal or exceed the total social
value under the chosen project (i.e., the sum of the shareholders’
and M’s combined expected payoﬀs), or µ0 · ∆q from Table 3.
pS
, must
• Of this total bid, the fraction directed to shareholders pS+p
M
σ
σ
be set equal to µ , where recall that µ represents the fraction of
0
0
Þrm value to social value under the chosen project.123
122

The amount paid to managers could take the form of a lucrative post-acquisition
employment contract. Note that by virtue of her share ownership, M also stands to
gain a σ−fraction of the price paid to shareholders.
123
To see this, note from Table 3 that the ratio of Þrm value to total social value is
precisely equal to µσ . If price ratio oﬀered by B were not set at this level, B could
0
get a more successful acceptance rate at no additional cost by setting the price ratio
accordingly.
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As previously noted, the total value of the project is q∆ if managed
by incumbent manager M, where ∆ = c = 1 if the manager has selected
P1. Should B acquire the Þrm, however, the expected value of the Þrm
is θ∆c ≤ θ∆ (since by assumption, c ≤ 1).
The bidder will therefore set its bid b so as to maximize expected
proÞts, where these are given by the probability that the bidder oﬀers
a bid suﬃciently high to induce both the manager and shareholders to
accept the bid, multiplied by the expected returns to the bidder of the
acquisition124 :
¾
½
b
π B (b; θ) = min
, 1 · (θ∆c − b)
µ0 ∆
Analysis of this problem implies that the proÞt maximizing bid125 for B
is b∗ = θ∆c
. In other words, the bidder will oﬀer an amount equal to
2
half the expected value of the Þrm under B’s management.
Now consider the probability that a takeover occurs when B follows
this bidding strategy. The prospects of a takeover clearly depend on the
value q, the incumbent manager’s quality. The greater the incumbent’s
quality, the lower the likelihood that the bidder will be able to increase
the value of the Þrm beyond that of current management, and thus the
lower the likelihood that the bidder will be able to make a successful bid.
By contrast, the lower the quality of the incumbent manager, the greater
the probability that the bidder will be able to Þnd a bid that will induce
both managers and shareholders to accept the deal. Mathematically, the
probability of a takeover for a given q is:
½µ
¶ ¾
2µ0
Pr {T akeover|q} = max
1−
q ,0
c
124

To see this, note that

π B (b; θ) = Pr {b ≥ µ0 · q · ∆} · (θ∆c − b)
½
¾
b
= Pr q ≤
· (θ∆c − b)
µ0 ∆
¾
½
b
, 1 · (θ∆c − b)
= max
µ0 ∆
125

Explicitly, the Þrst order conditions yield the following:
½ θ∆c
2µ0
2 if θ ≤ c
b∗ =
µ0 ∆ otherwise

But because µ0 ≥ 12 > 2c , we know that θ ≤ 1 ≤
always interior, and is that given in the text.
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2µ0
c ,

and thus the optimal bid is

A couple of points are worth some brief mention at this juncture.
First, as noted above, if q is suﬃciently high, there is no chance that
a takeover will occur, and thus the bidder cost parameter c never is at
issue. Thus, for these situations at least, it is clear that M’s incentives
relatively better aligned with those of the shareholders. In particular,
these managers are in eﬀect in a "no takeover" regime, and thus such a
high quality manager would never select a project solely to ensure a lower
chance of a takeover. By contrast, a lower quality managers (i.e., those
for which q ≤ 2µc ) does face a risk of a tender oﬀer and thus we must
0
consider whether such a manager might select project P2, even when it
is not eﬃcient, in order to deter tender oﬀers. Brief consideration, and
analysis below, suggests that she will not do so under managerial choice
because managerial choice ensures that a tender oﬀer can never make
her worse oﬀ than otherwise.
Given the likelihood of a takeover discussed above, we are now in
a position to characterize the total payoﬀs (that is, shareholders and
M’s expected payoﬀs) that could be expected under a managerial choice
rule. Given that shareholders and the manager are guaranteed their
total non-acquisition gains under a managerial choice rule, the expected
total payoﬀs to the shareholders and a managers are the non-acquisition
value of the Þrm plus the expected premium arising from a friendly deal.
Taking expectations yields the following expected total payoﬀ126 :
µ
¶
µ0
c2
Total Social Value =
+
∆
2
24µ0

Of this sum, recall that shareholders as a group receive a µσ portion
0
of the total
³
´ payoﬀ, while M’s private beneÞts constitute the remaining
1 − µσ portion. Dividing these up after accounting for the manager’s
0
shareholdings in the Þrm, the manager’s and non-managerial shareholders’ expected payoﬀs under each respective project are:

Payoﬀ
under´P1
under´P2
³
³
´ Payoﬀ
³
³
´
µ0
µ0
σ
σ2
1
σ
σ2
c2
Manager
+
+
+
1− µ + µ
1
−
∆
2
µ0
2
24µ0
0
´24µ0
´
³0
³µ0
1
σ
c2
∆
Non-M SHs µσ (1 − σ) µ20 + 24µ
(1 − σ) µ20 + 24µ
µ0
0 ³
0
0
´
³
´
2
µ0
µ0
σ
σ
Firm Value
+ 1
+ c
∆
³µ0 2 2 24µ
´0
³µ0 2 2 24µ
´0
µ0
µ0
c
c
Social Value
+ 24µ
+ 24µ
∆
2
2
0

0

Table 4

126

£This is derived
£
© by noting that
ª ¤¤ the total expected payoﬀ is equal to
−
µ
q∆
.
Eq µ0 q∆ + Eθ max 0, θ∆c
0
2
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Analysis of this table leads to the following proposition (whose proof
can be found in the appendix).
Proposition 2 Consider a market for corporate control subject a managerial choice rule. Regardless of the terms of the contract, M’s
choice of project coincides precisely
with
¢ that favored by the share¡
holders. The optimal contract wV , σ V sets w V = 0, and σ V < 12 .

The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward but important.
The Þrst part of it essentially states that when tender oﬀers are governed
by a managerial choice regime, managers will select the “right” project
for the Þrm. In other words, allowing a managerial control over tender oﬀers ensures that the manager’s incentives over project choice are
exactly aligned with those of shareholders, regardless of the manager’s incentive compensation. This result is fairly easy to understand: because
the prospective acquirer must ensure that both the manager and the
shareholders favor the acquisition, the bid must ensure that the manager obtains her private beneÞts of control. While this certainly may
chill some takeover bids (by making them more expensive), it removes
the manager’s incentive to choose P2 solely to chill takeover activity. In
eﬀect, the choice rule perfectly insures her against such an outcome. As
we shall see below, this aligning of incentives does not necessarily occur
under a shareholder choice rule.127
The second part of Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal contract
for the manager. Like before, the optimal Þxed wage for the manager is
zero. The optimal share compensation, σ V , on the other hand, is positive
but smaller than it would be in the absence of a market for corporate
control. The reason for this is a bit less obvious, but also straightforward:
unlike the case where no takeover market exists, in this case shareholders
know that at least with some probability their payoﬀ will come in the
form of a buyout rather than through M’s management. Consequently,
shareholders would like to increase the share of any takeover premium
that they (as opposed to M) receive. By decreasing σ (and thereby
increasing their own share of Þrm value), non-managerial shareholders
can claim a larger fraction of the buyout price when it occurs. On
the other hand, decreasing σ causes M to behave more wastefully in
situations where a takeover doesn’t occur, and could even reduce the
purchase price when a buyout occurs. Hence, shareholders will decrease
σ up until the point where the marginal beneÞt of claiming a larger share
127

Because it is technically tedious, we put oﬀ discussion the precise terms of an
optimal contract for the this case until the example discussed in a later section.
Nor is such a discussion necessary here, since Proposition 2 applies to all incentive
compatible contracts, and not just the optimal one.
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of the buyout surplus is exactly oﬀset by the marginal cost of weakening
the manager’s incentives.
5.3.2

Shareholder Choice Regime

We now transition to consider an alternative legal regime, in which the
success of tender oﬀers hinges solely on shareholder approval, with no
managerial veto rights. In particular, consider an alternative rule in
which a takeover bid requires the approval solely of the non-managerial
shareholders, who hold a (1 − σ) fraction of the Þrm.128 Assume, moreover, that managers cannot take any post-bid actions to aﬀect the probability that the shareholders approve the deal. The strategic eﬀect of
this regime is to induce all takeovers to be "hostile" ones, in that the
buyer need not give the manager any special treatment in making a bid
because the manager is no longer needed for approval. Thus pM is
equal to zero. (Recall, however, that the manager may still beneÞt from
a takeover to the extent that she owns a σ fraction of the Þrm).129
As before, we shall consider how such a scenario would play out for
project P2 (noting that P1 is a special case where c = ∆ = 1. Recall from
above that, ignoring any value diversion, the expected value of the Þrm’s
project is q∆ if managed by M, and θ∆c if by the bidder. Once private
beneÞts are accounted for, the total shareholder value of the company
under P2 is σq∆. Accordingly, under a shareholder choice regime, B will
set its bid b to maximize expected proÞts:
½
¾
b
π B (b; θ) = min
, 1 · (θ∆c − b)
σ∆
Analysis of this problem yields the proÞt maximizing bid for B of
128

130

Note that our focus here is on non-managerial shareholders, and not all shareholders. Of course, under both state acquisitions law and the Williams Act, tender
oﬀers are open to all shareholders (managerial or non-managerial). Nevertheless,
our focus on non-managerial shareholders is justiÞed for a number of reasons. First,
we are interesting in considering shareholder choice in those circumstances where the
rule matters most: where nonmanagerial shareholders could approve a hostile transaction but for managements’ use of defenses. Second, even if M held a majority of
shares, because this decision may have some elements of an interested transaction, it
would possibly require the vote of nonmanagerial shareholders to cleanse it anyway.
And Þnally, if M owned a majority of shares, she would be unlikey to approve a
tender oﬀer that did not also give her side compensation for her own private beneÞts,
and thus a shareholder choice regime would be no diﬀerent from a managerial veto
regime.
129
See infra Section 6 (discussing hybrid regimes)
130
Or equivalently,
½ c
θ · 2 ∆ if θ ≤ 2σ
c
b∗ =
σ∆ otherwise
Only if σ ≤

c
2

would B’s optimal bid exhibit a kink at θ =
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2σ
c .

©
ª
b∗ = min θc
∆, σ∆ . The probability of a takeover, in turn, depends on
2
the relative values of σ and c. Following the analysis from the previous
section, the probability that a takeover will occur is given by:
¶ ¾
½µ
2σ
Pr {T akeover|q} = max
1 − q ,0
c
Note that the probability of a takeover is decreasing in c; and thus, as intuition would suggest, the greater the negative impact of P2 on the gains
to a bidder the lower the probability of a takeover. Note also, however,
that the probability of a takeover is invariant to ∆, however. Because
the beneÞts of P2 are a common value, they would be fully realized by
both bidder and incumbent symmetrically. As such, only the costs of
P2 are reßected in the above expression through c.131 Comparing this
probability to its analog from the managerial choice section generates
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The choice of P2 over P1 strictly decreases the probability of a takeover under either shareholder choice or managerial choice. Moreover, holding compensation terms and choice
of project constant, whenever there is a positive probability of a
takeover, it is larger under a shareholder choice regime than it is
under a managerial choice regime.
Proposition 3 reveals that if managers select the same projects under
shareholder choice as under managerial choice, then shareholder choice
will indeed increase the probability of a serious tender oﬀer. We understand this argument to constitute a principal claim for most proponents
of shareholder choice. Indeed, so long as the underlying regime does
not aﬀect the upstream managerial decisions that M makes at the Þrm,
shareholder choice allows incumbent shareholders to claim the sole share
of the takeover premium, thereby facilitating the incidence of a takeover
bid.
Yet Proposition 3 also reveals why shareholder choice need not necessarily increase the probability of a serious tender oﬀer: shareholder
choice reduces the probability of a tender oﬀer in those circumstances
where the manager selects P2 under shareholder choice rule but would
have selected P1 under a managerial choice rule, because P1 maximizes
overall Þrm value. In this circumstance, shareholder choice rule potentially reduces both the probability of a takeover and the takeover
value of the company. Consequently, in order to evaluate the impact of
shareholder choice we need to determine whether managers would select
131

explain
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project P2, even if doing so does not improve Þrm value (and thus they
would not select P2 under managerial veto).
Now consider the expected value of the Þrm (or equivalently, total
share value) under the shareholder choice rule. Suppressing some tedious
algebra, the ex ante expected value of the Þrm under shareholder choice
is:
¡
¢
½
∆σ 1 − 2σ
if σ ≤ 2c
¡ 1 3cc2 ¢
Firm Value =
(4)
∆σ 2 + 24σ2 if σ > 2c

Note that this expression is increasing in both ∆ and c. This is intuitively sensible, since increases in ∆ mean a higher overall project payoﬀ,
while increases in c mean a more viable market for corporate control.
Either of these is good news for the Þrm’s shareholders. Non-managerial
shareholders, therefore, reap a (1 − σ) fraction of the above payoﬀ. M,
on the other hand, enjoys her pro-rata payoﬀ as a shareholder (i.e., a
σ− share of the sum calculated above) plus her private beneÞts should
no takeover occur. Once again suppressing some algebra, the following tables represent the parties respective payoﬀs depending on project
choice.
When the contract is such that σ ≤ 2c :
Payoﬀ under P1
¡
¢
(1−σ2 )
Manager
σ 2 1 − 2σ
+
σ
3
3
¡
¢
2σ
Non-M SHs σ (1
¡ − σ)
¢1 − 3
2σ
Firm Value σ ³1 − 3
´
1−σ 2
Social Value σ 1 − 2σ
+
3
3

When the contract is such that σ >

Payoﬀ under P1
¡1
¢
¡
1
+ σ 2 14 +
Manager
− 48σ
2
4
¡
¢
1
Non-M SHs σ (1 − σ) 12 + 24σ
2
¢
¡
1
Firm Value σ 12 + 24σ
2
´
³
1−σ 2
Social Value σ 1 − 2σ
+
3
3

c
2

1
16σ 2

Payoﬀ
under P2
µ
¶
2
¡
¢
1−σ
)
(
2σ
σ 2 1 − 3c + σ 3c
∆
¡
¢
2σ
σ (1
¡ − σ)
¢ 1 − 3c ∆
2σ
σ ³1 − 3c ∆
´
1−σ 2
σ 1 − 2σ
+
∆
3c
3c
:

Payoﬀ under
´ P2 ³
¢ ³³ 1
c2
− 48σ2 + σ 2 14 +
4
³
´
1
c2
σ (1 − σ) 2 + 24σ2 ∆
´
³
c2
∆
σ 12 + 24σ
2
´
³
1−σ 2
∆
σ 1 − 2σ
+
3c
3c

c2
16σ 2

´´

Comparing M’s payoﬀ with the non-managerial shareholders’ payoﬀ
in the two tables above, one is immediately struck by the fact that unlike in the managerial choice case, the manager’s and the non-managerial
shareholders’ payoﬀs are no longer strictly proportionate to one another.
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∆

Indeed, because a shareholder choice regime gives shareholders a unique
advantage over M when a takeover bid occurs, the manager has less
to lose by choosing P2 over P1, and may have something signiÞcant to
gain: the preservation of her private beneÞts of control. Consequently,
M has a greater incentive to choose P2 in situations where other shareholders would strictly prefer P1. This observation leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 Consider a market for corporate control subject a shareholder choice rule. For any contract (w, σ) , M will choose to pursue project P2 in strictly more circumstances than the shareholders would prefer. In other words, the manager may select P2 even
when doing so reduces total shareholder value.
The intuition behind this result is relatively simple to understand.
Under a shareholder choice regime, managers with relatively low quality
fear the loss of their private beneÞts of control. Because such managers
are not able to exercise a veto right at the time of the tender oﬀer, they
use the one tool available to them for avoiding a tender oﬀer: the choice
of project P2 over P1. Even if such a project does not yield signiÞcant
gains to the Þrm, the fact that it imposes costs on acquirers makes
it valuable to the manager in a shareholder choice regime, though not
necessarily good for overall Þrm value.
Recognizing this added agency cost imposed by a shareholder choice
regime, shareholders can choose to compensate in one of two ways. First,
shareholders could simply live with the manager’s wasteful attraction to
P2, and simply set M’s assuming that she will choose that project. Alternatively, shareholders could attempt to increase M’s incentive compensation to induce her to select the optimal project from the shareholders’ perspective. By inspection of the above expressions, however,
it is clear that the only way to fully align M’s incentives with that of
shareholders for every possible combination of c and ∆ is to set σ = 1,
eﬀectively giving the Þrm to the manager. Thus, depending on the
characteristics of P2, shareholders might opt for one of these strategies
over the other. Nevertheless, regardless of which strategy shareholders
take, there are range of situations in which a shareholder choice regime
makes non-managerial shareholders worse oﬀ than they would be under
a managerial choice regime. More formally, this argument is as follows:
Proposition 5 Consider a market for corporate control subject a shareholder
¡ SC choice
¢ regime, and an optimal incentive compatible contract
w , σ SC . When the costs imposed on the acquirer by project
P2 are suﬃciently large (that is, c is suﬃciently small), there
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exists a range non-empty interval (∆cL , ∆cH ) such that whenever
∆cL < ∆ < ∆cH , non-managerial shareholders would do better under a managerial choice rule.
The above proposition formalizes our central argument in this paper.
Even if one assumes that shareholders are fully equipped and coordinated
to evaluate and act upon a tender oﬀer, a shareholder choice regime need
not make shareholders better oﬀ (and may make them worse oﬀ) after
controlling for the up-front managerial decisions that M makes and optimal compensation packages. On the one hand, shareholder choice allows
existing shareholders to capture the entire value of the premium paid by
an acquirer, without being forced to split it with incumbent management. On the other hand, a shareholder choice rule can tempt M to
select projects that speciÞcally prevent takeover bids from materializing, particularly when the value of c is relatively small (and the divide
between managerial and shareholder incentives is the greatest). To be
sure, shareholders could attempt to stem this added incentive problem
by increasing M’s share compensation (σ). But so doing requires shareholders to surrender value to M regardless of whether a takeover ever
occurs. Such a loss can easily eclipse any speculative gain shareholders
would enjoy in the more remote circumstance of a takeover bid.
It should be noted, of course, that Proposition 5 does not suggest that
shareholder choice is systematically worse than managerial choice. To
the contrary, either regime may be optimal, depending on the relative
values of c and ∆. That observation, however, is precisely our point:
while some Þrms may ßourish ex ante under a shareholder choice regime,
others would be better oﬀ under a managerial choice rule. The likely
heterogeneity of circumstances Þrms face thus renders questionable any
proposition that a blanket rule of shareholder choice (or, for that matter,
managerial choice) is a prudent or eﬃcient policy to pursue.

5.4

A Numerical Example

Perhaps one of the best ways to understand the analysis above is to
examine a concrete example. Thus, consider a speciÞc case drawn form
the above model in which VH = $1 million, ∆ = 1 and c = 0. Note that
because ∆ = 1, P1 is always the optimal choice for this example, since
selecting P2 gives a beneÞt only to the manager of the Þrm who is better
able to stave oﬀ a takeover. In fact, in this example, the choice of P2 is
particularly severe, and it is able to deter all takeovers (an admittedly
extreme case, but one that underscores our point).
The table below presents the basic structure of the optimal contract
and the parties behavior in each case. Under a managerial choice rule,
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M always picks the eﬃcient project. Under shareholder choice, however,
this need not be so, as demonstrated above. In this case, however, the
negative repercussions of choosing P2 are so severe that the shareholders Þnd it worthwhile to incentivize M to choose the eﬃcient project
(P1). So doing, however, requires that M be paid a greater number of
shares in his compensation package. Indeed, under shareholder choice,
M receives 58% of the Þrm in incentive pay, while under managerial
choice, she receives only 48%. While this gives the Þrm a higher total
share value under shareholder choice ($360, 700 to $266, 700), a much
smaller fraction of this goes to the non-managerial shareholders. Indeed, the non-managerial shareholders have to compensate M so heavily
in a shareholder choice environment that they are left with a smaller
amount ($134, 300) than they would have in a managerial choice world
($134, 300) under a lower power incentive contract). Moreover, in this
example, managerial choice is pareto superior to shareholder choice, in
that the manager as well prefers managerial choice, notwithstanding the
fact that she receives more incentive compensation under shareholder
choice.
σ Proj. Soc. Val. Firm Val. Non-M Val. M’s Payoﬀ
Mgr. Choice .48 P1 $480, 600 $266, 700
$138, 700
$341, 900
SH Choice .58 P1 $467, 500 $360, 700
$134, 300
$333, 200
Table 7: Numerical Simulation
Finally, an interesting feature of the table above worth noting is that
notwithstanding the pareto superiority of managerial choice, shareholder
choice gives rise to a higher total share value for the company ($360, 700)
than does managerial choice ($266, 700). This observations provides a
cautionary note for those who would assess the eﬃciency of any legal
regime based on share value alone. In this case, the increase in share
value under shareholder choice is largely diverted to the manager, leaving
non-managerial stakeholders worse oﬀ.
To be sure, this example is a particularly stark one, chosen to highlight our arguments in this paper. But nevertheless, this section has
demonstrated more formally the possibility (and a reasonable one at
that) that shareholder choice proposals often have unintended eﬀects
when one considers distortions to ex ante behavior.

6

Hybrid Regimes

In order to illustrate our points, the previous two sections have focused
particular attention on two polar legal regimes: (1) Managerial Choice,
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in which managers enjoy unmitigated freedom to choose among which
(if any) potential acquirers the Þrm will consider; and (2) Shareholder
Choice, in which shareholders hold the ultimate authority to accept (or
reject) any post-bid or targeted defense. While this comparison is probably the most intuitive, it does not speciÞcally address the possibility that
some intermediate hybrid regime might be preferable to either of these
extremes. This subsection brießy considers such a possibility, focusing
on three types of hybrid regime.
First, some commentators have proposed a hybrid regime that turns
on how managers deter hostile oﬀers; under such ontological regimes,
courts could invalidate only certain defensive measures, leaving managers the discretion to use others that may appear to be less harmful
to non-managerial shareholders. While such approaches may hold some
promise, their eﬀectiveness hinges crucially on the ease with which managers can substitute between equivalent defeneses. When such substitution is possible, such a hybrid regime will do little either to reduce board
control over tender oﬀers or reduce board power. Consider, for example,
a rule under which courts invalidated pure defenses and those managers
undertake after a bid has been made. This limited rule would not
induce managers to adopt blanket defenses, because managers could instead employ substitute pre-bid embedded targeted defenses. Yet such a
rule would do little to facilitate hostile acquisitions, since managers could
simply shift to using pre-bid targeted defenses as a deterrent device. Alternatively, might could give shareholders the ability to overrule post-bid
any pure or targeted defense the board erects, regardless of when it is
adopted.132 To the extent shareholders credibly use this power to overrule defenses for any tender oﬀer that maximizes shareholder value, this
regime would eﬀectively replicate the same shareholder choice rule studied above, providing managers with an incentive to implement pre-bid
blanket embedded defenses. We are therefore rather pessimistic that
such an ontological hybrid regime would prove eﬀective.
Alternatively, courts might focus instead on pre-bid blanket embedded themselves, prohibiting them as a categorical rule. Although courts
likely cannot determine ex ante whether day-to-day managerial decisions
are likley to increase Þrm value, courts might still be able to isolate only
those blanket defenses that imposes suﬃcient costs on potential acquirors
to deter bids. In terms of the previous subsection’s model, this would
mean allowing courts (or shareholders) to invalidate any defensive measure for which the value of c is suﬃciently low. Prudently executed,
such a regime might well be able to stem some of the moral hazard
problems that we identiÞed above, and thereby facilitate the eﬃcient
132

Cite Black & Kraakman, Gilson. Þsch
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implementation of a more thorough-going shareholder choice regime. At
the same time, however, it is far from clear that either shareholders or
courts would be any better at assessing costs (in the form of c) than
they would be at assessing Þrm-speciÞc beneÞts of an embedded defense
(in the form of ∆). Indeed, both assessments require one to consider
abstract, prospective eﬀects of a particular business plan. This calculus
would be particularly diﬃcult — and the negative aﬀects on contracting
parties particularly great — if managers respond to oversight by including defenses in a variety of contracts, which impose small costs individually but large costs in totality.133 Moreover, it is diﬃcult to determine
whether regulating such “high cost” arrangements would be value increasing without having a much better sense of the value of Þrms of
entering into such deals. Without signiÞcant knowledge about the likely
distribution of beneÞts from pre-bid embedded defenses, courts would
have little hope of formulating and executing a prudent policy.
Perhaps ironically, the best hope for shareholder choice may come
from a retreat from the doctrinal certainty that many choice proponents
(and legal scholars more generally) have long sought. Consider, for example, a regime in which the court indicates that it will invalidate some,
but not all, managerial defenses but deliberately obscures which types
of defenses are challengable. While such legal indeterminacy and opacity may seem unwise on Þrst blush, it may give courts a way to award
shareholders a partial ability to restrain managerial resistance. Indeed,
if managers are uncertain whether a speciÞc defense will ultimately be
upheld, they may be willing to allow bids that do not fully compensate
them for their lost private beneÞts. Moreover, so long as managers had
at least some conÞdence that a defense might be upheld, they might also
be willing to make value maximizing project choices notwithstanding the
legal uncertainty.134
To see this, consider a version of the example from the previous subsection in which there is some uncertainty about whether the ultimate
rule will be one favoring managerial choice or shareholder choice. In
particular, suppose that there is a 75% chance that a court will allow
managers to veto a bid, versus a 25% chance that shareholders will ultimately be allowed to accept a bid. Note that because the manager is still
much more likely than not to be given freedom to select among bidders,
133

Regulating such contracts would be particularly likely to decrease Þrm value
because third parties could not tell, simply by looking at their own contracts, the
likelihood that the court would invalidate the potentially defensive term.
134
For another analysis of how legal uncertainty can augment allocational eﬃciency
through bargaining, see Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a
Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L. J. 1017 (1994).
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she is not tempted (as she would be under shareholder choice) to select
(ineﬃcient) Project 2. Consequently, the optimal contract would award
the manager with a 47% share of the Þrm (down from 48% under a managerial veto and 58% under a shareholder choice regime). More importantly, non-managerial shareholders would expect a payoﬀ of $149, 540
under this hybrid regime, up from $138, 700 under the managerial choice
rule. Managers, on the other hand would lose slightly, expecting a payoﬀ
of $340, 700 (down from $341, 900). Yet on the whole, this type of hybrid
regime would increase total social welfare above that of either extreme
rule. Consequently, while our analysis points out an important cost of
shareholder choice that is worth appreciating, in many circumstances an
optimal policy may lay somewhere between the two extremes studied
above.135

7

Empirical Fit

Before concluding, it is perhaps prudent to situate our conceptual argument within the growing empirical literature on corporate governance.
So doing will allow us to gauge the “Þt” of our claims as a practical
matter. As it turns out, many of the points we have made above have
some support in the empirical data, and may even oﬀer alternative explanations for phenomena that legal and Þnance scholars have found
curious.
Perhaps most directly, our results may help to explain investors’
rather tepid response tot shareholder choice proposals. If strong-form
shareholder choice proponents are correct, one would expect shareholders of many, if not most, Þrms to support such proposals. Such support would be manifest in many ways, such as wide-spread resistance
to tender oﬀer defenses in IPO charters; support for charter provisions
restricting board’s ability to adopt the poison pill (or requiring boards
to redeem the pill if shareholders support a deal); and support for shareholder proposals seeking to declassify boards of existing Þrms. Moreover,
one would expect the percentage of Þrms that limit board power over
tender oﬀers to have increased over time, with the rise of institutional
investors.
The existing evidence does not demonstrate consistent, growing, pressure for shareholder choice. Indeed, much of the existing evidence has
found exactly the opposite. For example, study by Robert Daines and
135

Thus, empirical evidence that very strong forms of managerial veto lower Þrm
value relative to that under Delaware law is not inconsistent with our analysis. See
Daines (data on Mass). We argue that strong shareholder choice may reduce Þrm
value relative to a hybrid regime; yet in turn, strong managerial veto also may reduce
shareholder value relative to a hybrid regime.
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Michael Klausner of over 300 initial public oﬀerings between 1994 and
1997 found that a majority explicitly included anti-takeover provisions
in their charters.136 Indeed, over 60% of the IPO Þrms had charters that
explicitly strengthened the poison pill by either establishing a staggered
board or by making it diﬃcult for shareholders to replace the board between annual meetings.137 No Þrm included a provision to either limit
board authority to adopt anti-takeover provisions in the future, or to
prohibit or limit the use of poison pills.138 Moreover, the proportion of
Þrms going public with staggered boards appears to have increased over
time. A study by John Coates found that the percentage of Þrms going public with staggered boards increased from 34% in the early 1990s
to 82% in 1999.139 Moreover, this increased use of staggered board
occurred over the very period in which shareholders have come to understand the tremendous power of the staggered board as a defensive
mechanisms.140
Nor have shareholders of existing Þrms actively campaigned for shareholder choice. Notwithstanding the rise of institutional investors, shareholders of existing publicly held Þrms have not campaigned vigorously
to either limit power control over tender oﬀer defenses or to restrict
136

Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protections in IPO Charters, 17 J. Law, Econ. & Organ. 83 (2001);
see Laura Casares Field & Jonathan Karpoﬀ, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 107
J. Finance 1857 (2002) (53% of industrial Þrms going public between 1988-1992
employed at least one antitakeover defense).
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Kahan & Rock, supra note 885 (discussing a study by Robert Daines and Michael
Klausner and subsequent analysis of their data).
138
Daines & Klausner, supra note , at 95. This results are consistent with those
obtained by John Coates, [lawyer paper] , at 1353, 1376; Field & Karpoﬀ, supra note
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John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1301, 1376 (2001).
140
See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note ; Lynn Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses
Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 Stan.
L. Rev. 845, 854 (2002); see also Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note
, (showing the signiÞcant eﬀect of staggered boards on the expected success of a
hostile acquisition).
Similarly, new Þrms appear more willing to incorporate in states with relatively
strong anti-takeover laws than in those with weak anti-takeover laws. Incorporators
of such Þrms would not be expected pursue such protections if they expected to be
penalized by the IPO market. Guhan Subramanian, The Inßuence of Antitakeover
Statutes on Incorporation Choice in the 1990s: Evidence on the ”Race” Debate and
Antitakeover Overreaching, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1795 (2002); see Lucian Bebchuk &
Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, John M. Olin Working Paper
No. 352 (2002). Shareholders’ willingness to accept antitakeover restrictions is not
unlimited, however. While new Þrms’ are more likely to incorporate in states with
moderate anti-takeover protections, they are less likely to incorporate in jurisdictions
with ”severe” antitakeover laws. Subramanian, supra, at 1844.
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boards’ use of the pill. Despite early interest in precatory shareholder
resolutions seeking to control board use of the pill, since 1996 the number
of such resolutions has declined to an average of less than 10-15 per year.
Moreover, these resolutions generally fail (although they have garnered
more shareholder votes than previously).141 Institutional shareholders
— including state pension funds — also have not used their considerable
political power to advocate for legislative adoption of shareholder choice
regimes.
What is at the root of this lack of shareholder interest in maximizing
their choice? There are many plausible explanations. One possibility
is that the proponents of managerial control are right: post-bid shareholders gain more value from a bid when managers are in control of the
bidding process.142 Another possible explanation may be found in deÞciencies in the IPO market and in the process process.143 Our analysis
present an additional explanation: shareholders recognize that “shareholder choice” would not, in fact, result in shareholders control over
tender oﬀers, because managers will respond to shareholder choice by
implementing other defenses, not regulated by the shareholder choice
regime. Thus, shareholders of many Þrms do not campaign against the
pill and ECB because eliminating these defenses would not result in
true shareholder choice, but would only induce managers to substitute
into other defenses which are likely to impose greater costs on the Þrm
than existing targeted pure defenses, such as the poison pill and ECB.
In other words, shareholders might well rationally accept board con141

Kahan & Rock, supra note , at 885-86.
Shareholders of existing Þrms have started to attempt to limit the use of one defense
— staggered boards — by resisting charter amendments to establish staggered boards
and voting in increasing numbers for shareholder resolutions seeking to declassify
existing classiÞed boards.Kahan & Rock, supra note , at 886-887. But this is far
from a general move to establish shareholder choice. Shareholders have not similarly
moved to restrict boards’ ability to adopt poison pills. Moreover, these anti-staggered
board eﬀorts have not been part of a general movement, but have been targeted at
particular Þrms. Id. Morever, they have either failed or have prevailed only in a
precatory form. Id.
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E.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note .
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Recently, Lucian Bebchuk has oﬀered an alternative potential explanation for
shareholders’ apparent disinterest in voluntarily adopting shareholder choice. He
shows that when managers have private information about Þrm value, and when
private beneÞts to managers are positively correlated with Þrm value, then Þrms
going public might not oﬀer a charter provision restricting defenses even though such
aprovision would be optimal. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Asummetric Information
and the Choice of Corporate Governance Arrangements (October 2002). This result
turns on the Þrms being unable to signal Þrm value through mechanisms other than
the charter provision of takeovers, and on the assumption that private beneÞts are
positively correlated with Þrm value.
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trol because they recognize that they cannot, in fact, preclude the use
of defensive measures, and given this would prefer to accept the costs
associated with targeted measures such as the poison pill and ECB in
order to avoid the greater evil of the alternative defenses managers would
employ.
Additional evidence exists to support our claim. Our previous analysis reveals that greater shareholder control over tender oﬀers could potentially lead to one of two phenomenon, if managers can implement
substitute value-reducing defenses: (1) managers could adopt these defenses or (2) shareholders could deter them from doing so by increasing
managers’ ownership share in the Þrm. The conclusion that managers’
share ownership should be higher when there are few antitakeover devices is contrary to a more classic agency cost view. In this view, Þrms
are more likely to employ incentive compensation when managers are insulated from the market for corporate control by anti-takeovers devices;
Þrms are less likely to employ incentive pay when managers are subject
to an active market for corporate control because the threat of a tender
oﬀer will help align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders.144
Consistent with our analysis, empirical analysis suggests that managers’ incentive pay is higher the lower their ability to use traditional
anti-takeover defenses. Consider, for example, the correlation matrix
below, drawn from a data set pairing executive compensation data with
corporate governance data of 1200 publicly traded Þrms in the year 2000.
The variable in the Þrst row (and column) represents the percentage of
outstanding shares owned by the Þrms highest paid executive (usually
the CEO), and represents a measure of incentive pay. The remaining
variables designate the existence of (2) blank check preferred stock; (3)
classiÞed boards; (4) a poison pill provision in the Þrm’s bylaws; (5) the
cross product of classiÞed boards and poison pills; and (6) the existence
of change of control provisions in executive stock options. Variables (2)
through (6) are all measures of how resistant a corporation is to hostile
144

For example, Kahan & Rock, supra note [chicago], suggest that Þrms responded
to the rise of takeover defenses by implementing adaptive defenses, such as executive
compensation, to alighn managers incentives with those of shareholders.
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bids.
% Shrs (CEO)
Blank Check
Class. Bd
Pois. Pill
(Cl.Bd)x(PP)
CoC (Options)

% Shrs (CEO)
Blank Check
1.0000
-0.1132
0.0114
-0.0008
0.9863
-0.2978
0.0000
-0.1985
0.0000
-0.2599
0.0000

Class. Bd

Pois. Pill

(Cl.Bd)x(PP)

CoC (Options)

1.0000
1.0000

0.1056
0.0002
0.1394
0.0000
0.1467
0.0000
0.0572
0.0474

0.2535
0.0000
0.6701
0.0000
0.1801
0.0000

1.0000
0.7153
0.0000
0.2994
0.0000

1.0000
0.2493
0.0000

Table 8: Exec. Share Ownership vs. Corp. Gov. Indicia145
Note that every antitakeover provision in the Table is positively correlated with every other one at least a 95 percent level, suggesting that
such provisions are often complements rather than substitutes for one
another. What is more surprising, however, the negative correlation
that each of these variables has with executive share ownership. Indeed,
every single antitakeover protection is negatively correlated with share
percentage, and all but one are statistically signiÞcant. Moreover, the
magnitudes of many these correlations are also moderately high.
Although this negative correlation between antitakeover protections
seems, on Þrst blush, to be counter-intuitive when measured against
conventional logic, it is completely consistent with our arguments in this
paper. Indeed, if one interprets the absence of antitakeover protection as
a form of shareholder choice at the organizational level, then the trends
identiÞed in the Table mimic exactly those identiÞed in the example
from the previous section. In particular, shareholder choice creates an
additional agency cost at the an ex ante stage, when managers select
among projects that may include embedded blanket defenses. Grossing
up the manager’s share compensation is one way to deter her from opting
for a value-reducing project that insulates her position.146 Consistent
with our Þnding, a recent study by Keith Harvey and Ronald Shrieves
Þnds that incentive pay is both positively related to the presence of independent directors and inversely related to leverage Þnancing.147 Both of
these tendencies seem to cut against the conventional operational agency
cost story, and towards our "tender oﬀer defenses" agency cost story.
145

Correlations done on a pair-wise basis; P-values in italics. Sources: Compustat
Executive Compensation Data for 2000; IRRC Governance Data for 2000.
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Of course, any such analysis presents an issue of determining which way the
causation runs. While the results above are consistent with our analysis, it is also
the case that managers who own a lot of shares have less need to seek tender oﬀer
defenses. We plan to examine this relationship in more detail in future scholarship.
147
See Harvey & Shrieves, supra note .
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1.0000

Although this is but a sampling of how our framework might be
tested empirically, it nonetheless suggests that the analytical arguments
presented above may help explain behavior in publicly traded companies.148

8

Conclusion

Delaware’s embrace of a “Just Say No” defense grants managers considerable ability to insulate themselves from the disciplining eﬀect of the
market for corporate control. This deference almost certainly results in
managers misappropriating far greater private beneÞts — and providing
shareholders less value — than they would if subject to a well functioning
takeover market.
Proponents of shareholder choice argue that the solution to this problem is for the courts to insist that shareholders be given ultimate authority to determine whether an acquisition should proceed. Such a
measure would permit shareholders to approve the hostile acquisitions
most likely to discipline management. These hostile acquisitions would
themselves increase shareholder welfare. Shareholder welfare also would
be increased to the extent that the increased threat of hostile acquisitions
reduced managers’ incentives to misappropriate private beneÞts.
These arguments for shareholder choice have considerable merit. Yet
they are not enough to win the day. The existing analysis generally presumes that managers subject to shareholder choice will remain passive
148

Finally, a comparison of the percentage of hostile oﬀers in the UK and the U.S.
does not obviously support the proposition that shareholder choice signiÞcantly increases the percentage of hostile takeovers. Over the period 1980-1998, the U.S.
and U.K. experienced approximately the same percentage of hostile oﬀers (21-23%),
notwithstanding that the UK places severe limits on managers’ ability to use the
poison pill and other targeted and post-bid defenses.Andy Cosh & Paul Guest, The
Long-Run Performance of Hostile Takeovers in the U.K.: Evidence (Sept 2001), p. 6
(deÞning hostile oﬀer as an unsolicited bid that managers initially tell shareholders to
reject). Moreover, the percentage of hostile bids declined in the UK in the 1990s, as
it did in the U.S.; given the City Code, the decline in the UK cannot be attributable
to the poison pill. Moreover, in 1995 (long after the Time-Warner decision), the
percentage of hostile tender oﬀers appears to have been higher in the U.S. than in
the U.K., falling in both countries towards the end of 1995. Compare Cosh & Guest,
supra, Figure 1, with G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In The Eyes of the
Beholder, J. of Finance (2001), Figure 1 (SDC deÞnition of "hostile"). While during
other periods the percentage of hostile oﬀers is lower in the U.S. than in the U.K., the
fact that it is the same or higher in the U.S. during some of the post-Time-Warner
period does not obviously support that claim that moving towards the British system
would increase hostile oﬀers.
Moreover, our analysis also reveals that one cannot assess the eﬀects of shareholder
choice without also examining the impact of the UK’s regime on the relative value
of shares going to management and nonmanagement shareholders.
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in the face of a challenge to their historical discretion. There is no reason
to expect that to be the case. Indeed, the history of acquisitions and
tender oﬀer defenses is one deÞned by managers continually adapting
new defenses to meet new threats to their control.
Full analysis of shareholder choice thus requires that we consider
the impact of this rule assuming that managers will act in their own
self interests and seek ways to either deter hostile bids in particular,
or friendly and hostile bids generally. In particular, consideration must
be given to the availability of embedded defenses — adopted long before
a tender oﬀer — as these are the defenses courts would be least able
to regulate without doing injury to the underlying premise that publicly
held Þrms should be managed by professional managers, not shareholders
(or courts).
An examination of existing pre-bid embedded defenses reveals a host
of potentially legitimate arrangements that can be employed to deter
takeovers. These include blank check preferred stock, management contracts, and change of control provisions in third party contracts. Moreover, these arrangements are suﬃciently varied and ßexible that one
must assume that managers — if suﬃciently motivated by a fear of hostile takeovers — could devise a variety of other pre-bid arrangements
which could operate as a serious impediment to bids.
This article has considered the risk that managers would adopt such
measures in response to shareholder choice. We conclude that although
managers would not adopt blanket defenses — that deter all bids — under
a managerial choice rule, managers could well respond to shareholder
choice by adopting blanket defenses. Managers subject to shareholder
choice would have much to gain from such defenses, as they would help
block hostile deals; and they also would have less to loose as shareholder
choice would squeeze out the friendly deals managers otherwise would
seek to protect. Accordingly, in order to retain their private beneÞts,
managers subject to shareholder choice would be more likely to either
adopt blanket defenses that deter all acquisitions, or at least threaten to
do so. In either case, shareholder choice can reduce the expected payoﬀ
of non-managerial shareholders.
Thus, shareholders’ apparent disinterest in campaigning aggressively
for shareholder choice may not be a product of collective action problems,
lack of information, or failures of the IPO markets. Rather shareholders
may fail to insist on shareholder choice because they recognize that it
is not available to them — not at least, under a regime of professional
managerial control of day-to-day business decisions. Shareholders could
block certain defenses, but not all defenses. As the defenses shareholders
can block — such as the poison pill — are, in the end, less destructive of
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Þrm value than other blanket defenses managers might employ, shareholders may live with the pill (and "Just Say No") for fear the alternative
would be worse.
This is not to say that shareholder choice is invariably inferior to
managerial choice. But the case for shareholder choice must depend
on more than simply a partial equilibrium claim that shareholders may
be better able to evaluate tender oﬀers than managers. Rather, the
case for shareholder choice must depend on a full comparison of the two
regimes, as they would actually be implemented. In particular, we must
consider shareholder choice recognizing that courts cannot regulate all
defenses and that managers will adapt and seek out defenses in those
zones beyond court regulation. Only if shareholder choice is superior
under such circumstances should we be willing to embrace it.
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